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Abstract

The thesis investigates the paradox of a word, “enfant,” or “child,” in its relation to ten works in the œuvre of Gilles Deleuze, as produced by him and with others. The paradox is that this word circulates less as this word, “enfant,” than as, in the vocabulary of *Différence et répétition* (1968), an Idea, whose differential virtuality is multiple, and that differentiates, or actualizes, across the surfaces of these ten texts, repeating in different forms. This differential circulation can also be read through the vocabularies of *Logique du sens* (1969) and *Qu’est-ce que la philosophie?* (1991). Differentiations include: “Dionysos-enfant” (1962); “Alice” of *Through the Looking Glass* (1969); “devenir-enfant” (with Félix Guattari, 1980); and “enfance du monde” (with Claire Parnet, 1988). The suggestion is developed that actualization of “enfant” for Deleuze also became an act, in that his suicide of 4 November 1995 resonates with both his “Dionysos” and “Alice.”

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Citation acronyms for works by Deleuze, Deleuze-Guattari, and Deleuze-Parnet

Abc  L’Abécédaire de Gilles Deleuze (video with Claire Parnet; subtitles by Charles Stivale)
A-Œ L’Anti-Œdipe, Capitalisme et schizophrénie I
A-O Anti-Oedipus, Capitalism and Schizophrenia I (translation)
Cc  Critique et clinique
D  Dialogues (Gilles Deleuze and Claire Parnet)
Der Différence et répétition
DaR Difference and Repetition (translation)
Drf Deux régimes de fous
ES Empiricism and Subjectivity (translation)
TRM Two Regimes of Madness (translation)
Lds Logique du sens
LoS The Logic of Sense (translation)
Mp Mille plateaux, Capitalisme et schizophrénie II
TP Thousand Plateaus, Capitalism and Schizophrenia II (translation)
N  Nietzsche (French)
Np Nietzsche et la philosophie
P  Pourparlers
Ne Negotiations (translation of Pourparlers)
Ps  Proust et les signes
Qqp Qu’est-ce que la philosophie?
WiP What is Philosophy? (translation)

Note: Translations not explicitly sourced to one of the standard versions designated above are by Douglas Ord. End notes to do with standard translations are numbered consecutively in the course of the thesis.
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**Introduction**

In 1965, the French philosopher Gilles Deleuze, then in his fortieth year, published a short book called *Nietzsche* for the “Philosophes” collection of Les Presses Universitaires de France. It begins with a description, under the heading “La vie,” of the first speech given by Zarathustra in Friedrich Nietzsche’s philosophical poem *Also sprach Zarathustra*, as published in 1883. The title generally given to this speech in translation is “On the Three Metamorphoses.” But there is a difference of emphasis between Nietzsche’s text and Deleuze’s descriptive reading. In direct translation from the German, the speech begins: “Of three metamorphoses of the spirit I tell you: how the spirit becomes camel; and the camel, lion; and the lion, finally, child” (Nietzsche 2003). Deleuze, however, in introducing the story, leaves out the sentence before the semi-colon, that poses “spirit” (*Geistes*) as a substratum of the metamorphoses: that is, the metamorphoses are “of the spirit.” He gives instead: “Le premier livre de Zarathoustra commence par le récit de trois métamorphoses: ‘Comment l’esprit devient chameau, comment le chameau devient lion, et comment enfin le lion devient enfant’.” (N 5).¹

This slight skewing / selective reading of a prior text is not, as will be seen, atypical of Deleuze. In this case, there is no implied continuity of “spirit” through the metamorphoses, as there is via Nietzsche’s first sentence, and indeed in his next two pages: for example (in the translation by Walter Kaufmann), “In the loneliest desert ... the second metamorphosis occurs: here the spirit becomes a lion who would conquer his freedom and be master in his own desert” (Nietzsche 1954 138). Deleuze, by contrast, continues his description:

> Le chameau est l’animal qui porte; il porte le poids des valeurs établies, les fardeaux de l’éducation, de la morale et de la culture. Il les porte dans le désert et, là, se transforme en lion: le lion casse les statues, piétine les fardeaux, mène la critique de toutes les valeurs établies. Enfin il appartient au lion de devenir enfant, c’est à dire Jeu et nouveau commencement, créateur de nouvelles valeurs et de nouveaux principes d’évaluation. (N 5)

There is no suggestion of an underlying continuity of “spirit,” however mutating, in this progression: for Deleuze, the culmination is in simply, “enfant.”
Thirty years later, in September 1995, Deleuze published his last work, when he was crippled by lung disease, attached to an oxygen machine, and barely able to write or speak. The six-page article, called “L’Immanence: une vie,” appeared in the journal *Philosophie* and also contains a variant on the term “enfant” or “child”:

Par exemple les tout-petits enfants se ressemblent tous et n’ont guère d’individualité; mais ils ont des singularités, un sourire, un geste, une grimace, événements qui ne sont pas des caractères subjectifs. Les tout-petits enfants sont traversés d’une vie immanente qui est pure puissance, et même béatitude à travers les souffrances et les faiblesses. (*Drf* 362)

In this case, the variant on the term “child” is plural and part of a distinctly ambiguous term, in that the hyphenated “tout-petit” can stand alone in French to mean “toddler.” Hence a literal translation here might be “toddler children.” As will be seen in Chapter IX, Deleuze’s “tout-petits enfants” has been translated for publication in multiple ways, with the ambiguity extending also to French-language commentary, in that Stéfan Leclercq, in a 2002 essay called “Deleuze et les bébés,” simply replaces “les tout-petits enfants” with “les bébés,” paraphrasing Deleuze’s “les tout-petits enfants se ressemblent tous” as “Tous les bébés se ressemblent.”

Neither Deleuze’s early exclusion of Nietzsche’s own introductory substratum “of the spirit” when introducing the “metamorphoses” spirit → camel → lion → child, nor the intense late ambiguity of the term “tout-petits enfants,” in association with the phrase “all resemble one another, and have hardly any individuality,” deserves to be ignored. In each passage, Deleuze performs an unhinging. In the first, he unhinges the metamorphoses spirit → camel → lion → child from Nietzsche’s introduction “of the spirit” to describe the process, simply by not mentioning Nietzsche’s first sentence. In the second, he unhinges “tout-petits enfants” from any underlying “individuality”; nevertheless, “les tout-petits enfants,” Deleuze of 1995 tells his reader, “are traversed by an immanent life that is pure power, and even beatitude across their sufferings and weaknesses.”

Between these two variants on the word “enfant,” or “child,” Deleuze produced some sixteen books under his own name, three to five more (depending on criteria used) with the radical Lacanian psychoanalyst and political activist Félix Guattari, and one with his friend and former student Claire Parnet: a book of “dialogues.” His collaboration with Parnet also took the form, in
1988-89, of eight hours of videotaped conversations out of topics chosen according to the letters of the alphabet. In many of these works, too, variants on the word “enfant” are distributed, even as, within the works themselves, Deleuze developed approaches to, and subversions of, ontology, semantics, psychoanalysis, art, the project of thought generally, and the discipline of philosophy specifically. A succinct assessment of these subversions’ scale is given by the joint biographer of Deleuze and Guattari, François Dosse, via quotation of Noëlle Châtelet, the wife of the philosopher and Hegel scholar François Châtelet. According to Mme. Châtelet, her husband, who taught with Deleuze at l’Université de Paris VIII à Vincennes, “thought that [Deleuze], more than anyone else in the twentieth century, had come up with a new way of seeing things” (Dosse 350).

François Châtelet’s stature as an historian of philosophy could be advanced as grounds for this reported claim’s being worth taking seriously. Of more immediate impact, however, in both eloquence and extremity, is the statement itself: the suggestion that Deleuze, “more than anyone else in the twentieth century, had come up with a new way of seeing things.” And so how, the question can be asked, might the term “enfant,” or “child,” as repeating with difference in Deleuze’s œuvre, including in works done with Guattari and Parnet, figure both in, and toward an understanding of – if such exists – Deleuze’s “new way of seeing things”?

This is a question that has been touched on, but not methodically explored in secondary literature on Deleuze, which is extensive not only in French, but in English. Most boldly, Walter Omar Kohan has provided a survey, dated 2006, in the journal Childhood and Philosophy out of Rio de Janeiro, called “Gilles Deleuze: Enfants et devenir-enfance: some fragments from the writings of Gilles Deleuze that concern childhood.” This is, however, what its title declares it to be: a sequence of excerpted and often lengthy fragments with minimal comment, with no attempt to discern pattern, and with the goal “not to illustrate a whole philosophical doctrine of childhood,” but simply “to present and make accessible to the readers some texts that may inspire them” (Kohan 12). Kohan gives this assessment of Deleuze in the article abstract:

all of his work carries the motives of childhood — full of a childlike desire to rethink the stereotypes and the commonplaces, and to wake up the spaces not yet thought in which the adult discourses of childhood and practices with children most often consist. (Kohan 12)
So sweeping a statement does not provide much in the way of specifics. For how, exactly, does “all” of Deleuze’s work carry “the motives of childhood”? How is it “full of a childlike desire to rethink the stereotypes and the commonplaces”? What is meant by “the spaces not yet thought in which the adult discourses of childhood and practices with children most often consist”? Does this last description, when looked at closely, even make sense? Also to the point, though, out of this assessment, might be the question: if “all” of Deleuze’s work is “full of a childlike desire to rethink the stereotypes and the commonplaces,” why is it so notoriously difficult of access, including in the often lengthy passages that Kohan proceeds to give in their original French. He gives three from *Différence et répétition* (1968), two from *Logique du sens* (1969), eight from *Mille Plateaux* (1980, done with Guattari), one from *Critique et clinique* (1990), one from a lecture on Leibniz dated to 1987, a long one from *L’Abécédaire de Gilles Deleuze* as the video done with Parnet and Boutang in 1988, and one from a 1973 interview on Freud (though the date of the interview is not provided).

What Kohan in his introduction focuses on, however, as especially important, is a book done for children, not exactly by Deleuze himself, but with his permission and – as Kohan puts it – his “enthusiasm,” by his friend of many decades, the children’s illustrator Jacqueline Duhême. The forty-page book, called *L’oiseau philosophie*, was published in 1997, less than two years after Deleuze’s suicide on 4 November, 1995, and is credited “Duhême dessine Deleuze.” For it, Duhême keyed intensely coloured watercolour paintings to excerpts (shorter than Kohan’s) from two texts, the 1977 *Dialogues*, done by Deleuze jointly with Claire Parnet, and the 1991 *Qu’est-ce que la philosophie?* done nominally – as will be considered – with Guattari. According to Jane Newland, who interviewed Duhême in 2012, the choice of excerpts was made by Martine Laffon, who had previously translated Jostein Gaarder’s *Sophie’s World*, which Deleuze had appreciated (Newland 2014b). These source books differ entirely from the seven cited by Kohan for his excerpts, making for the inference that while the latter in some way refer to “child and becoming-childhood,” as per Kohan’s unusual title, the shorter ones chosen for *L’oiseau philosophie* were in some way considered by Laffon to be especially suitable both for children, and for Duhême as artist. The book is dedicated to Deleuze’s grand-daughter Lola, and Laffon’s preface records Deleuze’s support, not least in Lola’s interest, toward “dégager des concepts philosophiques des événements purs, c’est-à-dire capable d’affecter une petite fille, sans suite de logique” (Duhême/Deleuze unpaginated).
Undoubtedly, there has been growing interest in Deleuze as an influence in pedagogy, including the teaching of children. This has included publication in April, 2013 of a 288-page volume in the, to this point, twenty four-volume *Deleuze Connections* series done by the University of Edinburgh Press, called *Deleuze and Education*, edited by Inna Semetsky and Diana Masny, with a dozen essays by different authors. Semetsky has also published a book of her own, *Deleuze, Education, and Becoming*, in which she relates the philosophical approach of Gilles Deleuze to the pragmatism of Charles Sandford Peirce and John Dewey. Absent in both these books, however, as in Kohan’s article, is any attempt to examine closely how the term “enfant”/“child,” in this form and in variations, develops and figures in Deleuze’s *œuvre*. Rather a criticism made by Johan Dahlbeck in a review of *Deleuze and Education* seems à propos. “Parts of the book,” Dahlbeck writes, “are rather obscured by what seems to me an excessive use of Deleuzian jargon.” He quotes the introduction by Semetsky and Masny by way of example:

> Encompassing both the formal and informal modes, the book reterritorialises the field of education in terms of experimental and experiential nomadic processes of multiple encounters embedded in life, and represents the very becoming-other of Deleuze’s original philosophical thought. (Semetsky and Masny 2)

Dahlbeck’s assessment of this passage is that “packed together in one sentence, these Deleuzian concepts (‘reterritorialises,’ ‘nomadic processes,’ ‘multiple encounters,’ and ‘becoming-other’) become very difficult to decipher and, as a result ... add little to the reader’s specific understanding of them in this context” (Dahlbeck).

This is a problem that seems to haunt commentary on Deleuze to do, at least, with this subject: selective seizure upon a set of terms: in this case most often from the book that provides the bulk of Kohan’s passages, 1980’s *Mille Plateaux*, done with Guattari. These terms are then deployed without much consideration as to how they, and the subject matter “child” / “becoming-child” to which they pertain, figure in relation to the density of Deleuze’s *œuvre* not only with Guattari, but before and after him. Another example of this tendency is provided by Markus Bohlmann, in his 2012 doctoral thesis for the Department of English at the University of Ottawa, called *Moving Rhizomatically: Deleuze’s Child in Twenty-First Century American Literature and Film*. Bohlmann states that his “project ... aims to show that children are talking
to us in a language that the adult fails to understand, if he or she even attempts to listen to children to begin with.” He continues:

To this end, I wish to advance a notion of language as a “rhizomatic semiosis” which is part of what Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari term “[c]ollective assemblages of enunciation [which] function directly within machinic assemblages” (*A Thousand Plateaus* 7 ...) by which language is seen coexistent with “becoming,” generating new modes of subjectivities. (Bohlmann 9)

Again, the emphasis is on *Mille Plateaux*, out of which Bohlmann states, in keeping with his title, that “Deleuze’s child ... moves rhizomatically” (Bohlmann 57). What is implied here, as in treatments previously cited, is that “Deleuze’s child” is continuous with the term “child,” and close variants thereof, as deployed in works by Deleuze and Guattari, especially *Mille Plateaux*. And likewise implied is that to consider the term via *Mille Plateaux* is therefore sufficient. But is this the case?

What seems especially lacking in secondary literature on both Deleuze and Deleuze-Guattari is careful consideration of how the general term “enfant,” as – in the vocabulary of *Différence et répétition* – an Idea as “differential of thought” and virtual multiplicity (*Der* 220, 236; *DaR* 169, 182) becomes actual, or differenciates, within Deleuze’s *œuvre*, including in works done with Guattari, Parnet, and, to a lesser extent, Duhême. This thesis proposes such investigation, with the preliminary note also that the term “enfant”/ “child” is introduced devoid of article because, as will be seen, even the distinction between definite and indefinite article is for Deleuze important. It is also persistently provided in this form, “enfant” / “child,” because the text that follows is itself a sustained inter-threading of French and English. The works considered are ten-fold: *Nietzsche et la philosophie* (1962); *Nietzsche* (1965); *Différence et répétition* (1968); *Logique du sens* (1969); “L’Anti-Œdipe” (Deleuze-Guattari, 1972); “Lettre à un critique sévère” (1973); *Mille Plateaux* (Deleuze-Guattari, 1980); *L’Abécédaire de Gilles Deleuze* (Deleuze-Parnet, 1988); “Ce que les enfants disent” in *Critique et clinique* (1993); and “L’Immanence: une vie” (1995). *L’oiseau philosophie: Duhème dessine Deleuze* (1997) will on account of its distinctiveness and posthumous publication be considered in the conclusion.

The thesis will also take the step of considering developmental permutations of the term “enfant” / “child” in Deleuze’s *œuvre* via parameters bequeathed by him in three works of method: two
that preceded the oft-cited *Mille Plateaux*, and one that followed. The earlier works are *Différence et répétition* (1968) and *Logique du sens* (1969), both written by Deleuze before his introduction to Guattari in 1969 (Dosse 3), and the first three chapters of *Qu’est-ce que la philosophie?* (1991), that is credited to Deleuze-Guattari. François Dosse, however, makes the cogent case that *Qu’est-ce que la philosophie?* “was manifestly written by Deleuze alone, but [that] he agreed to a coauthor credit with Guattari, as a tribute to their exceptionally intense friendship, suggesting too that the ideas developed in the book and its language were the fruit of their common endeavour since 1969” (Dosse 456).

According to Dosse, active collaboration between Deleuze and Guattari ended in 1980, after which Guattari fell into depression, becoming “catatonic, sitting with a pillow pressed to his stomach as if to protect himself from the outside world, watching television programs for days on end” (Dosse 425). Deleuze, by contrast, frequently after 1980 signalled his desire – as in a letter of 13 June, 1990 to Jean-Clet Martin – “to make the next book a short text on *What is Philosophy?*” (Drf 338). These distinctions are noted because, while many commentators seize on the conceptual vocabulary bequeathed by Deleuze-Guattari – “desiring machines,” “rhizomes,” “lines of flight” – including in regard to what Bohlmann nevertheless calls “Deleuze’s child,” there has by contrast perhaps been too little done toward cross-referencing the vocabularies of Deleuze’s three conceptual mapbooks / works of method: *Différence et répétition*, *Logique du sens*, and *Qu’est-ce que la philosophie?* This would seem in part to be a consequence of the attribution issue regarding the last of these. But when considered together, these three texts offer their own set of tools toward mapping how “enfant” / “child” takes different forms in Deleuze’s *œuvre*, including in works done with Guattari, Parnet, and Duhême.

Put in the simplest terms, that will be explicated in the course of mapping, the thesis makes the case that the term “enfant” / “child”

1) in relation to the vocabulary of *Différence et répétition* is an Idea, whose virtuality is differential and multiple, and that differenciates, or actualizes, across the surfaces of these ten texts, repeating in different forms under a single concept (which proves to be “devenir-enfant”/ “becoming-child,” as given this form in *Mille Plateaux*, but as introduced unhyphenated in Deleuze’s *Nietzsche* of 1965);
2) in relation to the vocabulary of *Logique du sens* is within this *œuvre* not a literal child but an incorporeal, whose status as sign is enhanced by its also being readable in terms of the “paradoxical element” that “cuts across” (*parcourt*) multiple series, making for their resonance; and

3) in relation to the vocabulary of *Qu’est-ce que la philosophie?* is a category of “personnage conceptuel,” repeating and differenciating as such on the plane of immanence of Deleuze’s thought.

Considered in terms of any common sense notion of “child” as a specific child, or a Christian notion of “Child” as the one and only Christ Child, the Idea “enfant”/”child,” as it actualizes in different forms in Deleuze’s *œuvre*, may sound bizarre. Certainly it differs not only from these understandings of “child” or “Child,” but also – as will be briefly considered – from phenomenological ones (such as by Maurice Merleau-Ponty) and psychoanalytic ones (such as by Sigmund Freud and Jacques Lacan). Indeed, this thesis makes the implicit case that the way “enfant”/”child” circulates in Deleuze’s *œuvre* paradoxically not as specific term, but through differenciation under different forms, is possibly unique.

Two points of method bear mention. First: so as to avoid issues, of which there are many, in standard translations, quotes from primary works will, apart from very short ones, be given in French. Where discrepancy between the French and the standard English translation pertains to the thesis focus, this will be mentioned, either in the text or in end notes whose numbering is sequential throughout the text. Secondly, the thesis often qualifies the proper name “Deleuze” with a date, as in “Deleuze of 1962,” “Deleuze of 1968,” and so on. In part, this is as an adjunct to a style of analysis that is developmental. But also, throughout his career, Deleuze argued against – as he put it in *Logique du sens* – “la forme de la personne et le point de vue de l’individuation” (*Lds* 124), such as he identified, in *Différence et répétition* with “une image dogmatique ou orthodoxe, image morale .... de la pensée” (*Der* 172). He and Guattari also opened *Mille Plateaux* with the statement “Nous avons écrit L’Anti-Œdipe à deux. Comme chacun de nous était plusieurs, ça faisait déjà beaucoup de monde” (*MP* 9). There are paradoxes here, in that Deleuze of 1991 asserts in *Qu’est-ce que la philosophie?* both that “les concepts sont et restent signés”(*Qqp* 13), and that “à la limite, n’est-ce pas chaque grand philosophe qui trace un nouveau plan d’immanence, apporte une nouvelle matière de l’être et dresse une
nouvelle image de la pensée” \textit{(Qdp 52)}. But given Deleuze’s persistent emphasis on multiplicity and difference, and his repudiation of the unity of the person as subject, it seems both fair and appropriate that this be recognized through acknowledgment that he was indeed himself “many” in the course over time of his many works.
1. Two books on Nietzsche (1962 and 1965)

“The story of the three metamorphoses” provides the beginning of Deleuze’s 1965 Nietzsche under the heading “La vie.” In his description, “the spirit” becomes camel, as the animal “which carries the weight of established values, the burdens of education, of morality, and of culture.” The camel carries these into the desert where it becomes lion, which “breaks the statues, tramples the burdens under foot, and leads the critique of established values.” Finally, it belongs to the lion to become child, “that is to say Game and new commencement, creator of new values and new principles of evaluation” (N 5). Deleuze of 1965 then moves abruptly in his text from this general allegory in the direction of biographical specificity:

Selon Nietzsche ces trois métamorphoses signifient, entre autres choses, des moments de son œuvre, et aussi des stades de sa vie et de sa santé. Sans doute les coupures sont-elles toutes relatives. Le lion est présent dans le chameau, l’enfant est dans le lion; et dans l’enfant il y a l’issue tragique. (N 5)

Deleuze again makes no reference to a substratum of “spirit” in this retelling. But specificity of reference to “the tragic outcome” as pertaining to the-child-that-would-become-Nietzsche – and so to “the life” / “la vie” of Nietzsche – is suggested in the next sentence, that shifts to biography and begins a new paragraph after a three-line blank space:

Frédéric-Guillaume Nietzsche nâquit en 1844, au presbytère de Roecken, dans une région de la Thuringe annexée à la Prusse. Du côté de la mère comme du père, la famille était de pasteurs luthériens... (N 5-6)

Deleuze then gives an eleven-page and therefore highly selective account of the life of Nietzsche, that veers away from the imagery of the story. After this, he provides a twenty four-page account of Nietzsche’s philosophy. Embedded in the latter is a passage on the figure of Dionysos as he evolves in Nietzsche’s œuvre after the early unpublished Die dionysische Weltanschauung (1870) and his first book Die Geburt der Tragödie aus dem Geiste der Musik (1872). Nietzsche’s Dionysos, according to Deleuze, develops past the “alliance with Apollo to produce tragedy,” through opposition to a Socrates “who judged and condemned life in the name of superior values.” According to Deleuze, the figure of Dionysos as presented by Nietzsche affirms that “life does not have to be judged, that it is in itself sufficiently just and holy.” But as
Nietzsche advances in his work, Deleuze asserts, “the true opposition appears to him: not so much Dionysos against Socrates, but Dionysos against the Crucified” (N 34). Deleuze suggests, in conspicuously partisan language, the terms of this opposition:

Leur martyre paraît commun, mais l’interprétation, l’évaluation de ce martyre diffèrent: d’un côté le témoignage contre la vie, l’entreprise de vengeance qui consiste à nier la vie; d’autre côté l’affirmation de la vie, l’affirmation du devenir et du multiple, jusque dans la lacération et les membres dispersés de Dionysos. Danse, légèreté, rire, sont les propriétés de Dionysos... Le seul mot avisé est Oui. (N 35)

This passage embeds Deleuze’s reading of Nietzsche’s Dionysos between the telling of “the story of the three metamorphoses” that begins his Nietzsche, and – as will be seen – his return to it to conclude his commentary. It indicates the extent of Deleuze’s early investment in Nietzsche and in the figure of Dionysos specifically, for this depiction of Dionysian affirmation is not given in neutral prose, but rather with enthusiasm. This affinity is emphasized by Jürgen Habermas in the sole mention of Deleuze in his 1985 Philosophical Discourse of Modernity:

Nietzsche seeks refuge in a theory of power, which is consistent, since the fusion of reason and power revealed by critique abandons the world to the irreconcilable struggle between powers, as it if were the mythic world. It is fitting that Nietzsche, mediated by Gilles Deleuze, has become influential in structuralist France as a theoretician of power. (Habermas 127; emphasis in the original)

And sure enough, Deleuze of 1965, as “mediator” of Nietzsche, also links Dionysos with “power”: “La Puissance, comme volonté de puissance, n’est pas ce que la volonté veut, mais ce qui veut dans la volonté (Dionysos en personne)” (N 24).

What Nietzsche himself had to say about this equation Dionysos / power / affirmation early in his own œuvre seems relevant here, because it provides a term that connects this triad with the word “child,” as it appears in “the story of the three metamorphoses.” Die dionysische Weltanshauung dates from 1870 and Nietzsche’s service as a stretcher-bearer in the Prussian army during the siege of Metz, France; it remained unpublished in his lifetime. As translated by Ronald Speirs, it contains the passage:
Dionysiac art ... is based on play with intoxication, with the state of ecstasy. There are two principal forces which bring naive, natural man to the self-oblivion of intense intoxication: the drive of spring and narcotic drink. Their effects are symbolized in the figure of Dionysos. In both states the *principium individuationis* is disrupted, subjectivity disappears entirely before the erupting force of the general element in human life, indeed of the general element in nature. (Nietzsche 1999 120, 129)

A key word introduced in Nietzsche’s description of “Dionysiac art” (“die dionysische Kunst”) is “play” (“Spiel”). And if the opening paragraph of Deleuze’s short *Nietzsche* of 1965 offers an especially striking introductory image of “enfant” / “child” in its opening paragraph, this reference to “play” hearkens back to his earlier and longer engagement with Nietzsche in *Nietzsche et la philosophie* of 1962. There the Deleuze of three years earlier himself interprets the Nietzschean linkage of “play” (“jeu”) with Dionysos:

> C’est la tâche de Dionysos de nous rendre légers, de nous apprendre à danser, denous donner l’instinct de jeu. Même un historien hostile, ou indifférent aux thèmes nietzschéens, reconnait la joie, la légèreté aérienne, la mobilité et l’ubiquité comme autant d’aspects particuliers de Dionysos. (*Np* 20)

“Play” is identified by Deleuze of 1962 with “le coup de dés” (“the throw of the dice”), to which he also ascribes wider resonance:

> Les dés qu’on lance une fois sont l’affirmation du hasard, la combination qu’ils forment en tombant est l’affirmation de la nécessité. La nécessité s’affirme du hasard, au sens exact où l’être s’affirme du devenir et l’un du multiple. ... Nietzsche identifie le hasard au multiple, aux fragments, aux membres, au chaos: chaos des dés qu’on choque et qu’on lance. *Nietzsche fait du hasard une affirmation.* (*Np* 29; italics in text)

The correlation is thereby established as much by Deleuze as by Nietzsche through Deleuze: “Savoir affirmer le hasard est savoir jouer” (*Np* 29).
So extreme a set of statements hints at the paradoxical seriousness with which Deleuze of 1962 invests “play,” in that the words “fragments,” “members,” and “chaos” suggest the ritual dismemberment of Dionysos that, in the myth’s tradition, completes intoxication. In the 1962 book, too, the contrast between Nietzsche’s Dionysos and Christ is fiercely put, and with a passion that seems to vitiate Petra Perry’s claim, in an otherwise helpful 1993 article called “Deleuze’s Nietzsche,” that these two books of 1962 and 1965 were simply part of “the routine prescribed for obtaining a professorship,” and “introductions directed largely to undergraduates preparing for exams” (Perry 176). On the contrary: the sections on Dionysos, on play, and – as will be seen – on “child,” introduce in partisan and passionate language, through Nietzsche and through imagery derived from Nietzsche, terms that will receive more complex variable development in Différence et répétition and Logique du sens. The former would be described by Deleuze in 1986 retrospect as “the first book in which I tried to ‘do philosophy’” (DaR xv), and the latter in its preface as “an attempt at a logical and psychoanalytic novel” (Lds 7). Their complementarity will be seen to extend to the figure of “enfant” / “child.”

“L’opposition de Dionysos et du Christ,” Deleuze asserts to his reader, ambiguously as though speaking for Nietzsche,

se développe point par point, comme l’affirmation de la vie ... et la négation de la vie... La mania dionysiaque s’oppose à la manie chrétienne; l’ivresse dionysiaque s’oppose à une ivresse chrétienne; la lacération dionysiaque, à la crucifixion; la résurrection dionysiaque, à la résurrection chrétienne; la transvaluation dionysiaque, à la transubstantiation chrétienne. (Np 18)

In this point by point comparison, that also reads as advocacy for Dionysos, there is also, as might be expected given Christian narrative’s inclusion of “the Christ Child,” a place for Dionysos as “enfant” / “child,” precisely in relation to “a game.” According to Deleuze,

Deleuze elaborates on this relation “player-artist-child,” establishing scenarios for each:

Le joueur s’abandonne temporairement à la vie, et temporairement fixe son regard sur elle; l’artiste se place temporairement dans son œuvre, et temporairement au-dessus de son œuvre; l’enfant joue, se retire du jeu, et y revient. Or ce jeu du devenir, c’est aussi bien l’être du devenir, qui le joue avec lui-même: l’Aiôn, dit Héraclite, est un enfant qui joue, qui joue au palet. (Np 28)

This last reference is to a fragment of Heraclitus, of which there are many numberings and translations: Charles H. Kahn (numbering it 94) gives “Lifetime is a child at play, moving pieces in a game” (Kahn 75); William Harris (numbering it 24) gives “Time is a child moving counters in a game” (Harris 12); and John Burnet (numbering it 52) gives “Time is a child playing draughts” (Burnet Web). Deleuze’s French retains “Aiôn” for the Greek αἰών given by translators as “time” and “lifetime.” Many of the words and phrases that appear in Deleuze’s account of Nietzsche’s Dionysos and Dionysian child – the game, play, the throw of the dice, the being of becoming, the eternal return – will be developed in Différence et répétition and Logique du sens. But “Aiôn” as a kind of time – a present of instantaneity with the expanse of past and future on either side – will figure prominently in the latter, as derived from Deleuze’s reading of “the Stoics,” and with an especially rich particularization of “child.”

It is with the two books on Nietzsche, in 1962 and 1965, that a focus on “enfant” / “child” enters Deleuze’s thought, and does so through his engagement with and – as Habermas puts it – mediation of Nietzsche, that is also mediation of Heraclitus. “Le secret de l’interprétation d’Héraclite,” Deleuze asserts, is that “à l’hybris, il oppose l’instinct de jeu” (Np 28). Deleuze quotes without giving a source: “Ce n’est pas un orgueil coupable, c’est l’instinct du jeu sans cesse réveillé, qui appelle au jour des mondes nouveaux” (Np 28). And he continues in his own voice, hinting at the approach to ontology shortly to be developed in Différence et répétition:

Non pas une théodicée, mais une cosmodicée: non pas une somme d’injustices à expier, mais la justice comme loi du monde; non pas l’hybris, mais le jeu, l’innocence. (Np 28)

The term “cosmodicée” here seems to offer both an approximate homonym to, and implicit pun
on “coup de dés,” subtly embedding the latter term in an approach to cosmology.

The short book of 1965 provides, through “the story of the three metamorphoses,” an especially striking annunciation of a “devenir enfant” / “becoming child” that Deleuze equates with “Game and new beginning, creator of new values and new principles of evaluation.” But it is Nietzsche et la philosophie, with its terms of “Zeus-enfant” linked to Nietzsche’s Dionysos – “un enfant qui joue” – that helps fill in this announcement. Likewise Deleuze of 1962 quotes Nietzsche’s Zarathustra as saying (in Book III, “On the Mount of Olives”): “Ma parole est: laissez-venir à moi le hasard, il est innocent comme un petit enfant” (Np 30). But it is clearly Deleuze’s voice that draws a parallel with Stéphane Mallarmé’s typographically radical poem Un Coup de Dés Jamais N’Abolira Le Hasard, published fourteen years after Nietzsche died in 1900:

L’homme ne sait pas jouer. Même l’homme supérieur est impuissant à émettre le coup de dés... Le vieux maître est “un pont,” quelque chose qui doit être dépassé. Une “ombre puérile,” plume ou aile, se fixe à la toque d’un adolescent,... apte à reprendre le coup de dés. Est-ce l’équivalent du Dionysos-enfant, ou même des enfants des îles bienheureuses, enfants de Zarathoustra? (Np 37)

In this case the terms “Dionysos” and “child” are expressly joined: “Dionysos-child.”

What emerges from this look into Deleuze’s early works on Nietzsche is a constellation of terms that, as not just described but advocated for by Deleuze, interconnect: “child,” “Dionysos,” “affirmation,” “power,” “game,” “chance,” “throw of the dice,” “innocence.” The advocacy aspect is important. Undoubtedly Perry is correct to an extent in writing that “from David Hume, sa vie, son œuvre (1952) through Le Bergsonisme (1966) and including both of the books on Nietzsche, Deleuze’s publications ... are introductions directed largely to undergraduates preparing for exams” (Perry 176). But clearly also, rather in the style of his artistic contemporaries the Situationists, Deleuze of 1962 and 1965 hijacks the form (fait un détournement) toward a kind of advocacy on behalf of both Nietzsche and his Dionysos.

Nietzsche develops further, in its third part, the reading of “the story of the three metamorphoses” with which Deleuze’s text begins, and in doing so introduces a significant variant on the term “enfant” / “child.” In a “Dictionary of Nietzsche’s principal characters,”
Dionysus is cited “in his different aspects”: “in relationship with Apollo”; “in opposition with Socrates”; “in contradiction with Christ”; and “in complementarity with Ariadne.” (N 46). Last on the alphabetical list is “Zarathustra (and the Lion),” which provides a paragraph remarkable in both density and force of advocacy to conclude not only the “Dictionary” but Deleuze’s text: the book’s remaining sixty pages consist of his choice of excerpts from Nietzsche’s œuvre, making for sustained collage. In this last paragraph, the figure of Dionysos is set in relation not only with the figure of Zarathustra (who does not speak explicitly of Dionysos in Nietzsche’s poem), but also with “the story of the three metaphorphoses.” Zarathustra is not Dionysos, Deleuze tells his reader, “but only his prophet”: an agent of the Lion’s “sacred No,” which is “a trans-nihilist No, ... inherent in the transmutation.” Yet “in truth,” Deleuze asserts,

Zarathoustra n’en reste pas au Non, même sacré et transmutant. Il participe pleinement de l’affirmation dionysiaque, il est déjà l’idée de cette affirmation, l’idée de Dionysos.... De même que Dionysos est le père du Surhomme, Zarathoustra appelle le Surhomme son enfant. (N 49)

Deleuze here presents “enfant” in the form of the Overman offspring of Dionysos, by implication able to play. The prophet Zarathustra, however, he asserts, “toujours ... est dépassé par ses propres enfants; et il n’est que le prétendant, non pas l’élément constituant de l’anneau de l’éternel Retour” (N 49). Deleuze will develop further the theme of “the eternal return,” left unfilled-in by Nietzsche after his mental collapse of 1889, in Différence et répétition. But to conclude his contribution to Nietzsche, he returns to “the story of the three metamorphoses” with which it begins, and does so with a difference that hints, in miniature, at the approach he will take to ontology through repetition and difference in 1968. Zarathustra, Deleuze concludes, “produit moins le Surhomme qu’il n’assure cette production dans l’homme, créant toutes les conditions dans lesquelles l’homme se surmonte et est surmonté, et dans lesquelles le Lion devient Enfant” (N 50).

Thus do both “le lion” and “l’enfant,” introduced in lower case letters at the start of Nietzsche along with the phrase “il appartient au lion de devenir enfant,” become capitalized at its end, even as “Enfant,” unlike “le Lion” is affirmed without an article, either definite or indefinite. This makes for a sense of annunciation, whose fulfilment in “Enfant” / “Child” can be filled in by Dionysian traits, hearkening back to “Dionysos-enfant,” as Deleuze has used the phrase in
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1962, with reverberation also in the description of “enfant” / “child” in the story that begins Nietzsche: “c’est-à-dire Jeu et nouveau commencement, créateur de nouvelles valeurs et de nouveaux principes d’évaluation.” The lower case “child” that begins Nietzsche thus by its end is an implicit part of a three-part capitalized constellation Dionysos – Game – Child.

Deleuze would shortly also write in Différence et répétition that Nietzsche is, with Kierkegaard, “de ceux qui apportent à la philosophie de nouveaux moyens d’expression... Ils inventent, dans la philosophie, un incroyable équivalent de théâtre, et par là fondent ce théâtre de l’avenir en même temps qu’une philosophie nouvelle” (Der 16-17). In the two books on Nietzsche, Deleuze of the early 1960s explores the “characters” of Nietzsche’s “new means of expression” for philosophy. Prominent among these are Dionysos and Zarathustra, and prominent in relation to both of these are specific actualizations, across these texts’ surfaces, of a general term, “enfant” or “child,” conjoined with a range of associations: game both capitalized and uncapsulated, “le coup de dés,” chance, affirmation, power, innocence, play.

In Différence et répétition, too, three years after Nietzsche, Deleuze will provide what François Zourabichvili has called not an ontology but an approach to ontology (Zourabichvili 8). Folded into this approach is a distinction between “the virtual” and “the actual,” that enables a vocabulary for how an Idea (une Idée), such as “enfant”, is, as domained unactualized in the virtual, paradoxically a differential multiplicity: “réelle sans être actuelle, différenciée sans être différenciée, complète sans être entière” (Der 236, 276). For Deleuze of Différence et répétition, Ideas in their virtuality “emanate” from “chance,” given figuratively in terms of “des coups de dés”: “Les Idées sont les combinaisons problématique qui résultent de coups” (Der 256, 258, 255). This language of “the throw of the dice,” and of Ideas as the affirmation of chance (Der 256) cross-references with the constellation of terms linked with “Dionysos-enfant” in Nietzsche et la philosophie. Ideas become actual, according to Deleuze, through a “differenciation” (Der 236) that is at once “qualification et composition, spécification et organisation” (Der 276): this can indeed be cross-referenced with the actualization and differenciation of the Idea “enfant,” in different way, across the pages of Deleuze’s various works, as considered here.

Yet in affirming chance and “the throw of the dice” as the source of Ideas, Deleuze seems paradoxically also to distance himself from both the drama and the specificity of “Dionysos-enfant,” as considered in the Nietzsche books. This he does by stating that to link “the
imperative origin of Ideas” with affirmation of chance is not to invoke “le simple arbitraire d’un jeu d’enfant, l’enfant dieu.” Rather it is to affirm “toute combinaison, et chaque coup qui la produit” (Der 256). This model for the generation of Ideas in the virtual can indeed be tied to how the Idea of “enfant” / “child” circulates in the virtual for Deleuze and differentiates / becomes actual across the surfaces of his books, making for both articulation and illustration of the model especially in the Nietzsche books. But its “differenciation” precisely in Différence et répétition moves away from the mythic specificity of “Dionysos-enfant” and into a version that, while less specific, plays a role in Deleuze’s articulation of how, in his approach to ontology, human individuation itself takes place.
2. “Un enfant” in *Différence et répétition* (1968)

Deleuze of 1968 described his approach to ontology in *Différence et répétition* as

> une révolution copernicienne qui ouvre à la différence la possibilité de son concept propre, au lieu de la maintenir sous la domination d’un concept en général posé déjà comme identique. (*Der 59*)

It is fair to say that Deleuze, as the advocate of Nietzsche he revealed himself to be in the books of 1962 and 1965, accepted out of this reading, and as a condition in his approach to philosophy, Nietzsche’s proclamation “God is dead” (made in “The Parable of the Madman” in *The Joyful Wisdom*, and via Zarathustra’s forest meeting with the old saint in Part One of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra.*) Deleuze’s own proclamation of “Copernican revolution” is more understated, implicitly referencing Immanuel Kant’s appropriation of the term to his style of transcendental critique. But Deleuze’s version is preceded by its terms:

> Que l’identité n’est pas première, qu’elle existe comme principe, mais comme second principe, comme principe *devenu*; qu’elle tourne autour du Différent, telle est la nature d’une révolution copernicienne... (*Der 59*)

Likewise the book’s Preface records:

> Ce que ce livre aurait dû rendre présent, c’est donc l’approche d’une cohérence qui n’est pas plus la nôtre, celle de l’homme, que celle de Dieu ou du monde. En ce sens, ç’aurait dû être un livre apocalyptique... (*Der 4*)

There is an element of paradox to these claims, in that structurally, the book is in keeping with its academic role, when Deleuze was forty three, as his “principal thesis for the Doctorat d’État” (*DaR 4*). It entails his readings not only of Nietzsche for, in this case, the concept of “eternal return,” but of the thirteenth century Scottish theologian/philosopher John Duns Scotus for the concept of “univocity” of being, and Baruch Spinoza for – as Deleuze attributes to him – concepts of immanence, affirmation, and expressiveness of being ... but all unhinged from underpinnings in “God” as teleological, purposive, and unified. Writing retrospectively in 1986, in a typescript turned into the Preface to Paul Patton’s 1994 translation, Deleuze framed the
radical question posed by this recombination: “À la limite, y aurait-il une seule et même puissance, de différence et répétition, mais qui s’exercerait seulement dans le multiple et déterminait les multiplicités?” (Drf 281).

This is Deleuze’s paradoxical application of the concept of univocity, that is crucial toward understanding his approach to ontology. Decoupled from Christian teleology and eschatology, it hearkens back also to Nietzsche’s late aphorism, translated by Anthony Ludovici:

Mankind does not advance, it does not even exist. The aspect of the whole is much more like that of a huge experimenting workshop where some things in all ages succeed, while an incalculable number of things fail; where all order, logic, coordination, and responsibility is lacking. (Nietzsche 1914 72; Section 90)

“The essential of univocity,” Deleuze of 1968 tells his reader,

n’est pas que l’Être se dise en un seul et même sens. C’est qu’il se dise, en un seul et même sens, de toutes ses différences individuantes ou modalités intrinsèques. L’Être est le même pour toutes les modalités, mais ces modalités ne sont pas les mêmes. ... L’Être se dit en un seul et même sens de tout ce dont il se dit, mais ce dont il se dit diffère: il se dit de la différence elle-même. (Der 53)

A simple way of putting this might be: What is, is, and is equally, but different. In this sense univocity is multiplicity (the paradox). But this surely does not make for implicit reversion to the primacy of the One, as claimed by Alain Badiou (Badiou 78). Rather what is asserted is equality of being for multiplicity and difference: “L’univocité de l’être donc aussi l’égalité de l’être. L’Être univoque est à la fois distribution nomade et anarchie couronnée” (Der 55).

The term “crowned anarchy” (anarchie couronnée) itself hearkens back, in more abstract terms, to the link between “child” and Dionysos developed by Deleuze in Nietzsche et la philosophie, via Heraclitus. The entire fragment referenced by Deleuze of 1962 as “Aiôn ... is a child who plays, who plays at quoits (au palet)” reads in the three translations:

Time is a child playing draughts, the kingly power is a child’s. (Burnet, giving it as 52);
Lifetime is a child at play, moving pieces in a game. Kingship belongs to the child. (Kahn, as 94);

Time is a child moving counters in a game; the royal power is a child’s. (Harris, as 24).

This equation of kingly power/kingship/royal power/ with “a child” / “the child” is implicitly referenced by Deleuze in *Nietzsche et la philosophie* via his own term “Zeus-child,” which he immediately equates with “Dionysos, whom myth presents to us surrounded by his divine toys” (*Np* 28). For Deleuze of 1962, Dionysos is the kingly child, the child of royal power, the crowned child, whose innocence of play is equatable with the throw of the dice, the game of chance. In *Différence et répétition* Deleuze of 1968 transposes this language of allegory into terms of ontology, with, nevertheless, this volatile carry-over “crowned anarchy,” as a term for “univocity of being.” The adjective “crowned” in this context therefore recalls the crowned child: the child of royal power, the kingly child of Heraclitus, the Zeus-child that Deleuze of 1962 equates with Dionysos. The noun “anarchy” recalls the activities associated with this child: play, game, chance, innocence, Dionysos “surrounded by his divine toys.”

Deleuze’s approach to ontology in *Différence et répétition* involves also his adaptation and development of Nietzsche’s concept of “eternal return.” Deleuze has already elsewhere acknowledged (*N* 38) that Nietzsche’s account of “the eternal return” was “interrupted by madness, which prevented a progression that Nietzsche had explicitly planned.” He takes up the project, relating “eternal return” to repetition and difference:

... la répétition dans l’éternel retour consiste-t-elle à penser le même à partir du différent. ... La roue dans l’éternel retour est à la fois production de la répétition à partir de la différence, et sélection de la différence à partir de la répétition. (*Der* 60)

This is an assertion of movement as ontologically prior – *becoming* as repetition of difference and differenciation of repetition – that is subversive of inherited categories, including those of “God, self, and world.” “Car, affirmé dans toute sa puissance,” Deleuze writes,
l’éternel retour ne permet aucune instauration d’une fondation-fondement; au contraire il détruit, engloutit tout fondement comme instance qui mettrait la différence entre l’originaire et le dérivé... Il nous fait assister à l’effondement universel. (Der 92; italics in the text)

This could be interpreted as “the bottom dropping out.” And yet Deleuze equates it with “full positivity and pure affirmation” (“positivité pleine et affirmation pure”) (DaR 269; Der 345).

“Univocity of being,” that repeats with difference, and differenciates in repeating, makes – Deleuze asserts in the Preface – for “l’approche d’une cohérence qui n’est plus la nôtre, celle de l’homme, que celle de Dieu ou du monde” (Der 4). And among the interthreadings of Différence et répétition is precisely an investigation of how such a coherence is experienced: “Nous croyons à un monde où les individuations sont impersonnelles, et les singularités, préindividuelles: la splendeur du ‘ON’” (Der 4). The term “singularity” will continue to develop and be deployed by Deleuze, especially in Logique du sens in relation to surface, and to a theory of “incorporeals” that equates them with “events.” But for Deleuze of Différence et répétition, there is a “throwing forth” (“lancer”) of singularities by repetition in the context of eternal return (Der 260). The question of how human experience is formed in such a context entails the first explicit re-appearance / repetition with difference of the term “enfant” / ”child” after the annunciation “the Lion becomes Child” that ends Deleuze’s contribution to Nietzsche.

The insertion is not prominent: “Child” becomes “a child,” introduced via the indefinite article “a” with neither name nor specificity. But in reintroducing “child” (and “Child”) as “a child,” Deleuze of 1968 seems also to be in implicit dialogue with, and counterpoint to, the phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty and his 1960 lectures “Les relations avec autrui chez l’enfant.” Merleau-Ponty’s “child” is by contrast introduced explicitly via the definite article – “l’enfant,” with a phenomenological anchorage in a centrality of self implied in his very chapter titles “One’s own body from birth to six months” and “After six months: consciousness of one’s own body and the specular image” (Merleau-Ponty 121, 125; emphases added). But Deleuze’s iteration is also clearly informed by the version of “the child” that appears, with definite article, in Sigmund Freud’s Beyond the Pleasure Principle, in the famous case study of “little Hans” who throws his toy away with the cry “Fort!” (“Go away”) and retrieves it with the cry “Da!” (“There”) (Freud 9).
This reconstitution of “enfant” / “child” as “un enfant/ “a child” in Différence et répétition quickly becomes for Deleuze, out of the simple grammatical convention of there being a prior referent, “l’enfant” / “the child.” It is therefore important to remember that this prior referent, by means of which “enfant” / “child” is reintroduced, is as “un enfant” / “a child,” in the context of a very different approach, from both Merleau-Ponty and Freud, to “individuation” in the second chapter, “Repetition for Itself.” Deleuze begins the account where the reconstitution will appear with utmost prepersonal generalization, writing that “la vie biopsychique implique un champ d’individuation dans lequel des différences d’intensité se distribuent ça et là, sous forme d’excitations” (Der 128). This passage exemplifies the paradox of Deleuze’s “transcendental empiricism”: an evaluative description of what are presented as material processes, yet at a level of implicitly categorical abstraction. “On appelle plaisir,” he continues,

le processus, à la fois quantitatif et qualitatif, de résolution de la différence. Un tel ensemble, répartition mouvante de différences et résolutions locales dans un champ intensif, correspond à ce que Freud appelait le Ça, du moins à la couche primaire du Ça. Le mot “ça” ne désigne pas seulement en ce sens un pronom redoutable inconnu, mais aussi un adverbe de lieu mobile, un “ça et là” des excitations et de leurs résolutions. (Der 128)

With this account, Deleuze configures individuation, in effect, from the bottom up (“the primary layer of the Id”), rather than with any sense of the phenomenological priority of “one’s own,” such as builds the proprietary into Merleau-Ponty’s phrasing. Foregrounded instead in “biopsychical life” is a “field of individuation where differences of intensity distribute themselves here and there in the form of excitations” (emphasis added). Again, there is the paradox: the language is of material relations (and materialism), but couched in terms that it would be a challenge to verify experimentally. But this description is compatible with the approach to ontology developed in Différence et répétition, whereby “univocity of being” speaks in multiplicities and differenciating repetitions of singularities.

Deleuze then proceeds, via Freud’s Beyond the Pleasure Principle, to a claim that “l’excitation comme libre différence doit, en quelque sorte, être ‘investie,’ ‘liée,’ ‘ligotée,’ de telle manière que sa résolution soit systématiquement possible. ... [On] passe ainsi d’un état de résolution éparse à un statut d’intégration, qui constitue le seconde couche du Ça ou le début d’une
organisation” (Der 128). The description is completely impersonal and prepersonal; the “bindings” as a next stage make for what Deleuze calls “passive syntheses”:

Les pulsions [English: drives] ne sont rien d’autre que des excitations liées. Au niveau de chaque liaison, un moi forme dans le Ça; mais un moi passif, partiel, larvaire, contemplant et contractant. Le Ça se peuple de moi locaux, qui constituent le temps propre au Ça, le temps au présent vivant, là où s’opère les intégrations correspondant aux liaisons. (Der 129)

“Individuation” is thus schematized impersonally, and via the ambiguity of the French reflexive pronoun “se.” Paul Patton, in translating Deleuze’s use of this pronoun to form reflexive verbs in Différence et répétition, consistently gives the passive voice: for example “an ego is formed” for “un moi se forme.” But this could just as well, and perhaps more consistently with an ontology of active multiplicities, be translated as “an ego forms itself”; likewise, mutatis mutandis, other constructions by Deleuze using “se.” So for the next phase: “une synthèse active s’établit sur la fondation des synthèses passives.” The assertiveness of Deleuze’s prose is striking: it is as though he is stating fact, even as the terms of the statement are at once abstract, categorical, and, implicitly, universal. And it is in these terms too, in the context of one of his first engagements with Freud, that Deleuze explicitly reintroduces the term “enfant” / “child” to his work, giving it as an example of how this process develops, and providing a first enrichment since the annunciation in Nietzsche.

The vocabulary is very different from that through which “enfant” / “child” is introduced, in the Nietzsche books, in association with allegory, poetry, and myth, and with the associated terms “game,” “play,” “chance,” “innocence,” “power,” “new beginning,” and Dionysos / Zarathustra. It is toward explaining the relation of the passive and active syntheses, and the latter’s role in formation of the Ego in relation to objects (“the test of reality”) that Deleuze gives the following, stated again in categorical and general terms, to do with an abstracted child:

Un enfant qui commence à marcher ne se contente pas de lier des excitations dans une synthèse passive, même à supposer que ces excitations soient endogènes et naissent de ses propres mouvements. On n’a jamais marché de manière endogène. (Der 132)
“A child,” then, as introduced in *Différence et répétition* is simply a child starting to walk. But as established humbly and impersonally, this “child” then gives Deleuze of 1968 a way of explaining what he describes as “a double development, in two very different directions,” out of the passive synthesis (*Der* 130). The first has to do with an actual object:

D’une part, l’enfant dépasse les excitations liées vers la position ou l’intentionnalité d’un objet, par exemple la mère comme but d’un effort, terme à rejoindre activement “en réalité,” par rapport auquel il mesure ses échecs et ses succès. (*Der* 132)

But this, Deleuze asserts, is only one part of the “double development” out of the passive synthesis. For

*d’autre part et en même temps,* l’enfant se constitue un autre objet, un tout autre type d’objet, objet ou foyer virtuel qui vient régler et compenser les progrès, les échecs de son activité réelle: il met plusieurs doigts dans sa bouche, entoure ce foyer de l’autre bras, et apprécie l’ensemble de la situation du point de vue de sa mère virtuelle. (*Der* 132; italics in the text)

Deleuze claims that any inference that, because “the child” is looking at “the real mother” while “sucking” in this way, she is the object of the activity, is “erroneous.” On the contrary:

Le suçotement n’est agi que pour fournir un objet virtuel à contempler dans un approfondissement de la synthèse passive; inversement la mère réelle n’est contemplée que pour servir de but à l’action, et de critère à l’évaluation de l’action dans une synthèse active. Il n’est pas sérieux de parler d’un égocentrisme de l’enfant. (*Der* 132)

Deleuze in giving this remarkable depiction as exemplary does not cite clinical studies, as Merleau-Ponty was committed to doing. Alain Beaulieu has pointed out that:

Les sources utilisées par Merleau-Ponty dans ces cours sont nombreuses. Elles vont des psychologues et psychanalystes (Freud, Jean Piaget, Klein, Lacan, etc.) jusqu’aux phénoménologues (Husserl, Heidegger, Max Scheler, etc.) en passant par les anthropologues, les linguistes et les “gestaltistes.” (Beaulieu 2009 302)
Nor does Deleuze begin from a specific case, as Freud does with “little Hans” and the “Fort-Da” game. Rather in this new manifestation as “a child,” which is also the referent for subsequent mentions of “the child,” Deleuze’s “child” is perhaps itself “an entirely other kind of object,” cross-referenceable with “the virtual” as a term that anticipates a distinction between “bodies” and “incorporables” soon to be developed in his analysis of “the Stoics” in *Logique du sens*.

This “child” of *Différence et répétition* is presented as generalizable and so impersonal: itself a function of processes that build out of the unconscious (“le Ça”).

So this, Deleuze appears to be telling his reader, is how it is for “a child,” with the analogy to the impersonal “characters” of Samuel Beckett’s *How It Is* – Pim, Kram, Krim – surely not out of place. Yet in the intensity of hand-mouth relation described by Deleuze, this version of “a child” perhaps most suggests, to a twenty first century reader steeped in the iconography of global popular culture, a highly unusual specific instance about which Deleuze could not have known, because it was not yet actual in 1968. In the 1980 Stanley Kubrick film version of Stephen King’s 1974 novel *The Shining*, little Danny Torrance, played by Danny Lloyd, holds his knuckles close to his mouth as he “talks” to his imaginary – or virtual – “friend” Tony (Appendix A). Is this “a child” that, in this set of gestures, is generalizable? Danny Torrance is a strange child, given to trances and premonitory visions. But Deleuze, too, in the set of particulars he opts to associate with “a child” in this crucial part of *Différence et répétition* seems – with paradox given the presumed generalizability – to emphasize the unusual: “Des phénomènes très divers comme le gauchisme, l’écriture en miroir, certaines formes de bégaiement, certaines stéréotypies, pourraient s’expliquer à partir de cette dualité de foyers dans le monde enfantin” (*Der* 132). The mention of “mirror writing” is itself almost eerily anticipatory in regard to Kubrick’s Danny, who in response to Tony’s voice writes the word “REDRUM” in lipstick on a door, which his mother sees reflected in the dresser mirror as “MURDER.” And likewise: the mention of “mirror writing” also anticipates the next differenciation of “enfant” / “child” in Deleuze’s *œuvre*: the distinctive “Alice” of Lewis Carroll’s *Through the Looking Glass* in *Logique du sens*.

Deleuze is emphatic, however, in universalizing: “en vérité, à partir de la synthèse passive de liaison, à partir des excitations liées, l’enfant se construit sur une double série” (*Der* 132). The ambiguity of the French reflexive verb, lost in English translation, seems relevant here, in that it
grammatically allows for the possibility not just of ambiguity but of oscillation between two readings: one in the active voice (“the child constructs itself on a double series”), as is implied in the sentence structure; the other in the passive impersonal (“is constructed”). The active voice implies becoming (“constructs itself”). The passive voice implies being (“is constructed”). Firm identity for the very term “enfant”/”child” is thereby subverted, along with a clear sense of agency in what is doing the constructing: an ambiguity in keeping with an approach to ontology that gives priority to becoming, difference, and multiplicity.

Deleuze cites a single supportive source for this construction of “a child” on two series: the French phenomenologist Henri Maldiney, and a 1967 course at the University of Lyon on *Le Moi*. But it is an important citation, yielding as it does what Deleuze elsewhere in *Différence et répétition* might call a new “image of thought” that “forces us to think” (*Der* 181). Deleuze asserts that:

> les deux séries sont objectales: celle des objets réels comme corrélats de la synthèse active, celle des objets virtuels comme corrélats d’un approfondissement de la synthèse passive... Une série n’existerait pas sans l’autre; et pourtant elles ne se ressemblent pas. (*Der* 132)

Deleuze then paraphrases Maldiney on childhood movement (*démarche*), affirming his claim that “le monde enfantin n’est nullement circulaire ou égocentrique, mais elliptique, à double foyer qui diffère en nature, tous deux objectifs ou objectaux pourtant” (*Der* 132-133). Deleuze then extrapolates to provide a compelling image:

> Peut-être même, d’un foyer à l’autre, en vertu de leur dissemblance, se forment un crosissement, une torsion, une hélice, une forme de 8. Et le moi, qu’est-il, où est-il, dans sa distinction topique avec le Ça, sauf au crosissement du 8, au point de jonction des deux cercles dissymétriques qui se coupent, le cercle des objets réels et celui des objets ou foyers virtuels. (*Der* 133)

Thus “a child,” in *Différence et répétition*, is schematized toward illustration of a model of ego formation at the intersection of real and virtual series, that are also configured in terms of “asymmetrical circles.” Deleuze goes on to assert that it is “à cette dualité de deux séries corrélatives qu’on doit rattacher la différenciation des pulsions de conservation et des pulsions
sexuelles” (Der 133): this is, again, “differenciation” with a “c” as active becoming. The model of “a child,” related to Deleuze’s reading of Freud rather than of Nietzsche, and couched in terms of generalizable abstraction rather than of allegory, poetry, and myth, nevertheless hearkens back to the Dionysian child of the Nietzsche books in pertaining to “the new.” In this case, “the new” has to do with a schematic model of generative series, one “real,” one “virtual,” that in intersecting at the crossing of “the figure 8” produce, according to Deleuze, terms for ego formation, and so of individuation. It is a model that will be carried further, by different means, with a different vocabulary, and with reference to a different “child,” one called Alice, in perhaps the most methodologically radical of Deleuze’s books, Logique du sens, the next year, 1969.

Deleuze of 1965 writes admiringly of Nietzsche that he “intègre à la philosophie deux moyens d’expression, l’aphorisme et le poème,” and that “ces formes mêmes impliquent une nouvelle conception de la philosophie, une nouvelle image du penseur et de la pensée” (N 17). Deleuze of 1968 carries this advocacy of genre-slippage also to Différence et répétition, writing that “la recherche de nouveaux moyens d’expression philosophiques fut inaugurée par Nietzsche, et doit être aujourd’hui poursuivie en rapport avec le renouvellement de certains autres arts, par exemple le théâtre ou le cinéma” (Der 4). There is no mention at this point of “the novel” as also a genre in which “new means of philosophical expression” might – or “must” – be pursued. But Deleuze also in 1964 published Proust et les signes, a study of Marcel Proust’s À la recherche du temps perdu, that he depicts in terms of “recherche de la vérité” as “l’aventure propre de l’involontaire. La pensée n’est rien sans quelque chose qui force à penser, qui fait violence à la pensée” (Ps 116-117).

Out of Différence et répétition, Deleuze was faced with the question of how, from “univocity of being” expressive of “singularities,” there comes to be “sense,” in the way of meaning. His method of negotiating this challenge is developed in Logique du sens, published in 1969, that he would sum up via the last words of a one-page avant-propos as indeed “un essai de roman logique et psychanalytique” (Lds 7).³ The result is in stylistic terms Deleuze’s most radical book, at once further generative of tools that can be used to understand how the figure of “enfant” / “child” continues to develop in his œuvre, and of a crucial instance of this development. How, amid what Deleuze in Différence et répétition calls “the dissolution of all preceding identities” (Der 260), in the context of an “eternal return” that repeats difference, is “sense” produced? Clearly there has to be some sort of screen, between production of “singularities” in a repetition that Deleuze links also to “la volonté de puissance, du monde de la volonté de puissance, de ses impératifs et de ses coups de dés, et des problèmes issus du lancer” (Der 260), and language, in order even for words to have any sense. It is consideration of such questions that pushes Deleuze into his own episode of radical genre-bending.

A characteristic of a novel, as the genre is most often understood, is that it presents and develops characters through situations. This is how, to an extent, Deleuze of 1969 develops Logique du sens. But it is far from being a conventional novel, and deserves to be considered, in the context
of his remarks on Nietzsche, as a hybridization of philosophy and novel, and as such a model for a kind of interdisciplinarity. Veering away from conventional approaches to the history of philosophy, *Logique du sens* is, on one level, a conceptual dialogue between Deleuze’s reading of the ancient Stoics, and his reading, in particular, of Lewis Carroll’s Alice stories. Out of this unlikely intersection, *Logique de sens* develops a theory of how sense (*sens*), as an incorporeal dimension of propositions alongside denotation, manifestation, and signification, is produced compatibly with an ontology of univocal being productive of difference, through “events” as singularities and intersections of relational series that take place across a surface.

The very structure of *Logique du sens* implicitly develops the “series” concept associated with “a child” in *Différence et répétition* in terms of the “double series.” Instead of conventional chapter breaks, as exist even in *Différence et répétition*, there are thirty four “series,” that follow the *avant-propos*. They succeed one another, as in:

Première série de paradoxes, du pur devenir

2ᵉ série de paradoxes, des effets de surface

3ᵉ série, de la proposition...

The series conclude:

33ᵉ série, des aventures d’Alice

34ᵉ série, de l’ordre primaire et de l’organisation secondaire

The “character” dimension of this “essai de roman logique et psychanalytique” is suggested by the proper name that appears in the next to last series, and that also begins the book’s “first series of paradoxes, of pure becoming”: Alice. This is indeed the Alice of Lewis Carroll’s *Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland* (1865) and *Through the Looking Glass, and What Alice Found There* (1871): “une petite fille” / “a little girl.” The text of *Logique du sens* proper begins, after the *avant-propos*:

Dans *Alice* comme dans *De l’autre côté du miroir*, il s’agit d’une catégorie de choses très spéciales: les événements purs. Quand je dis “Alice grandit,” je veux dire qu’elle devient plus grande qu’elle n’était. Mais par là même aussi, elle
devient plus petite qu’elle n’est maintenant. Bien sûr, ce n’est pas en même temps qu’elle est plus grande et plus petite. Mais c’est en même temps qu’elle le devient. (*Lds* 9)

Thus does Deleuze carry over into this new context the vocabulary of becoming developed in relation to ontology in *Différence et répétition*. The differentiacion of “enfant” / “child,” however, is introduced not in abstract a third of the way through the book, but rather right away and in specific terms, to illustrate the paradox of becoming. This investment in Alice, whom Lewis Carroll called “the puzzled child” within the text of *Through the Looking Glass* (Carroll 165), and “my little dream-child” in commenting outside it (Carroll 223), continues throughout the book, in relation to the other set of “characters” (or other series) that figures in Deleuze’s “attempt at a logical and psychoanalytic novel,” that he also describes in the avant-propos as “presenting series of paradoxes that form the theory of sense” (*Lds* 7).

These other “characters” are the ancient philosophers called by Deleuze “the Stoics,” who he claims were (like Nietzsche as Deleuze of 1968 describes him in *Différence et répétition*), “initiators of a new image of the philosopher,” in their case “breaking with the pre-Socratics, with Socratism, and Platonism,” and with “this new image ... already closely tied to the paradoxical constitution of the theory of sense.” (*Lds* 7). “The Stoics” are “reconstituted” by Deleuze mainly via texts by Émile Bréhier (1907) on the Stoic relation between bodies and “incorporeals,” and by Victor Goldschmidt (1953) on the Stoic concept of time. The term “reconstitution” is Deleuze’s own regarding Bréhier on the Stoics (*Lds* 14). But it can be applied in perhaps even stronger terms to Deleuze’s reading of the Stoics via Bréhier and Goldschmidt. This is a reading that Alain Beaulieu calls “creative” (Beaulieu 2005 45) and that a scholar of Stoicism, John Sellars, questions on both counts: bodies/incorporeals and time. According to Sellars, Deleuze’s claim that “Stoic ontology posits a surface populated on two sides by corporeal causes and incorporeal effects bears little relation to the ontology of the ancient Stoics. ... There is no Stoic concept of an ‘incorporeal event’ along the lines that Deleuze suggests” (Sellars 2007 178). Likewise, while according to Sellars “the recent scholarly consensus” is that “the Stoics held a theory of time close to Deleuze’s conception of *aiôn*, ... there is nothing to suggest that the Stoics held on to two distinct readings of time as part of one theory and nor is there any evidence to suggest that two such readings were referred to by the terms *aiôn* and *chronos*” (Sellars 2007 191, 193).
Nevertheless, these associations with the Stoics are what Deleuze of 1969 proposes in *Logique du sens*, with the distinction between bodies and a play of “incorporeals” as “events” taking place on a surface reconfiguring the distinction between the real and the virtual introduced in terms of the “double series” and the “figure 8” in *Différence et répétition*. He also claims that “the grandeur of Stoic thought is to show at once the necessity of two readings [of time] and their reciprocal exclusion” (*Lds* 77):

*Tantôt l’on dira que seul le présent existe [Chronos], qu’il résorbe ou contracte en lui le passé et le futur... Tantôt au contraire on dira que seuls le passé et le futur subsistent, qu’ils subdivisent à l’infini chaque présent, si petit soit-il, et l’allongent sur leur ligne vide [Aiôn]. (*Lds* 77-78; italics in text)

Would such distinction be confirmed via close reading of the textual record left by “the Stoics”? Sellars insists not. What seems crucial here, though, is that Deleuze has given himself an “out” regarding such criticism, precisely via the declaration that, in the French edition, prominently ends the first page of the “avant-propos”: “ce livre est un essai de roman logique et psychanalytique.” Accordingly – and this would seem to be implied in Beaulieu’s comment that Deleuze proposes “une lecture créative des Stoïciens” (Beaulieu 2005 45) – an element of authorial license must be allowed according to the terms of the genre “novel” (*roman*). Within the terms of this genre, both Deleuze’s “Alice,” and Deleuze’s “Stoics” can be read as characters in this “attempt at a logical and psychoanalytic(al) novel.” And likewise, this genre designation would seem to imply that Deleuze’s mappings be considered as to their own fecundity, rather than on the extent to which they comply with a close scholarly reading of the past model.

An aspect of this fecundity is that here again appears a term, “Aiôn,” that Deleuze has already introduced in *Nietzsche et la philosophie*, but in relation to Heraclitus (a pre-Socratic) rather than to “the Stoics.” As noted above, English-language translators of Heraclitus give this term as “time” or even “lifetime,” without reference to any specialized meaning such as Deleuze gives it in relation to “the Stoics.” Deleuze, however, also describes it in terms of “l’instant sans épaisseur et sans extension” (*Lds* 193), and so the temporal dimension of a surface of activation on which incorporeal events as singularities form and play, producing sense. This is Deleuze fine-tuning the ontological – perhaps even cosmological – model of a univocity of being that is immanent, affirmative, and expressive, that repeats with difference and differentiates in
repetition, that speaks in singularities and multiplicities that are prepersonal and impersonal, and that is linked – in the background, as per the Nietzsche books – with Dionysos as “puissance de l’affirmation” (N 35). “Sense” becomes “incorporeal.”

But worth recalling here, too, is both the passage in which the term “Aiôn” appears in Nietzsche et la philosophie, and the fragment in Heraclitus. For both link the term to the figure of “a child.” First Heraclitus (in the Harris translation): “Time is a child moving counters in a game; the royal power is a child’s” (Harris 12). And Deleuze: “Or ce jeu du devenir, c’est aussi bien l’être du devenir, qui le joue avec lui-même: l’Aiôn, dit Héraclite, est un enfant qui joue, qui joue au palet” (Np 28). Carrying forward the term “Aiôn” from Nietzsche et la philosophie to Logique du sens, it seems fair to infer that – if Deleuze was being consistent – its usage in the latter continues to be tied implicitly to the figure of “the child,” to “game,” to “becoming,” and even – through the full passage from Heraclitus – to “royal power” as “a child’s.” And indeed, this is the paragraph in Nietzsche et la philosophie that invokes “le joueur-artiste-enfant, Zeus-enfant: Dionysos, que le mythe nous présente entouré de ses jouets divins” (Np 28).

In Logique du sens, there is refinement of this network of associations not only through “the Stoics” – historically all, as philosophers, adult males – but also through particularization of “enfant” / “child” in the figure of “Alice,” as herself an incorporeal product of male imagination presented in terms of her “adventures,” especially as they take place in Through the Looking Glass (1871). “Dans toute l’œuv de Carroll,” Deleuze asserts, “il s’agit des événements dans leur différence avec les êtres, les choses, et états de choses” (Lds 19). For Deleuze of Logique du sens, concerned with exploring the production of sense along a surface, Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland (1865), as Carroll’s first book featuring Alice, is a transition from depth – “puits et terriers” in the earth – to the surface, including “figures de cartes, sans épaisseur” (Lds 19; italics in the text). This Deleuze describes in terms of Alice’s “adventure” (singular): “sa montée à la surface, son désaveu de la fausse profondeur, sa découverte que tout se passe à la frontière” (Lds 19). This first book is for Deleuze a preparation for Through the Looking Glass of six years later (1871) where, with a chessboard landscape laid out before her, Alice’s adventures take place on the surface. In Through the Looking Glass, Deleuze asserts:

les événements, dans leur différence radicale avec les choses, ne sont plus de tout cherchés en profondeur, mais à la surface, dans cette mince vapeur incorporelle
Yet to “free (dégage) her incorporeal double,” Alice to begin the story passes through a surface: that of “the looking glass.” She thereby becomes, as a fictional character embodied only in imagination, doubly incorporeal, and available to a sequence of adventures across a surface, in the form of a giant chessboard. By the end of these adventures, this particular child has indeed acceded to her own “royal power” in being crowned queen when she reaches the board’s eighth rank. Alice’s trajectory, then, implicitly hearkens back to the fragment from Heraclitus whose first part is quoted by Deleuze in Nietzsche et la philosophie, but with explicit reference there also to “Zeus-enfant: Dionysos”: the male child identified with “royal power” rather than the female. It is as though, with the prominence given to Alice in Logique du sens, Deleuze of 1969 acts to redress the gender imbalance in his having earlier focused on a boy-child (Dionysos).

This is clearly an idiosyncratic reading of Alice’s passage “through the looking glass.” But perhaps there is no better way to register a sense of the importance Deleuze gave both to “the puzzled child” Alice, and to her particular manifestation in Through the Looking Glass, than to step briefly outside the text of Logique du sens, and consider a fact. This is that the date in 1995 on which Deleuze, as a suffering being of flesh and blood, chose to throw himself fatally from a third-storey window at 84, Avenue Niel in Paris XVII, was 4 November (Colombat 235). At the time, and as described by François Dosse, Deleuze was suffering from lung disease that had been diagnosed as terminal, as well as from chronic asthma. He could barely speak, could no longer write, and was attached to an oxygen machine (Dosse 498). But what also bears noting is that, as a repeating date in the yearly calendar, 4 November is also the date on which, by general agreement, Lewis Carroll set Through the Looking Glass, as published at Christmas, 1871. For Alice, as a character constructed by Carroll, says in the first chapter to the black kitten:

“Do you know what to-morrow is, Kitty?” Alice began. “You’d have guessed if you’d been up in the window with me – only Dinah was making you tidy, so you couldn’t. I was watching the boys getting in sticks for the bonfire – and it wants
plenty of sticks, Kitty. Only it got so cold, and it snowed, so they had to leave off. Never mind, we’ll go and see the bonfire tomorrow.” (Carroll 117)

The historically established and recurring date of public bonfires in England – “tomorrow” for Alice in the text – is 5 November: Guy Fawkes Day. So the day before Guy Fawkes Day – “we’ll go and see the bonfire tomorrow” – is definitely 4 November. This also accords with *Through the Looking Glass* itself being a seasonal reversal (or mirror) of the explicit springtime date of 4 May for *Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland* – the book of “depth” for Deleuze – of six years earlier. What these designations imply, then, is that the repeating date linked with Alice’s passage “through the looking glass,” into the “surface” country of “the large chess-board” with its streams to cross, with Humpty Dumpty and his portmanteau words, Tweedledum and Tweedledee, and the Sheep’s Shop with – as Deleuze describes it – the “complementarity of ‘the empty shelf’ and of the ‘bright thing always in the shelf next above’” (*LoS* 41) ... is indeed the date, 4 November, that Gilles Deleuze chose to end an individuated life under this proper name, and also to end it in a particular way.

“Do you know what to-morrow is, Kitty?” Alice began. “You’d have guessed if you’d been up in the window with me ....”

Deleuze, too, was “up in the window.”

Alice passes through the vertical plane of the looking glass and becomes, as a character, doubly incorporeal.

Deleuze passed through the incorporeal plane that was defined by the window frame, and became, as corporeal, dead.

Fictionally speaking, Alice is always on 4 November when she is “up in the window” and, shortly afterward in the story’s narrative, goes “through the looking glass.” Alice is, in this textual sense, in Chronos, to recall the distinction credited by Deleuze to “the Stoics” in *Logique du sens* between Chronos (extended present) and Aiôn (extended past and future, with the present an infinitesimally thin surface of activation). And conversely, Deleuze chose, for the Aiôn that was the instant of his extinction as an individuated physical entity, the date in Chronos
4 November – as the date when Alice incorporeally always is, and is always, in her adventure “through the looking glass.”

This correspondence of dates and circumstances is fact. Was Deleuze aware of it? According to Dosse, he was certainly conscious and – insofar as he could speak – articulate in his final days. But he was also suffering from both emphysema and asthma; according to his friend Yves Mabin, “he was absolutely suffocating” (Dosse 498). Simon Critchley, in his Book of Dead Philosophers, suggests this condition as figuring in Deleuze’s choice of means of suicide:

Apparently, defenestration is not uncommon in patients suffering from emphysema, as Deleuze was. They are smothering, drowning really, and become desperate for air. On a sudden impulse, a high-speed fall appears one way of forcing air into one’s lungs, desperately gulping for a lungful of life. (Apparently, this is the reason why the respiratory wings in hospitals are typically located on the first floor and have bars on the windows.) (Critchley 237)

The speculative nature of Critchley’s explanation is suggested by the two-fold appearance, in this short passage, of the word “apparently.” “On a sudden impulse,” Critchley writes, “a high-speed fall appears one way of forcing air into one’s lungs, desperately gulping for a lungful of life.”

This image suggests a gasping fish, and – especially in combination with the emphasis on “sudden impulse” – does not credit any continued activity of Deleuze’s mind, as surely one of the most philosophically original and astute of the twentieth century. Nor does it speak adequately to the sense of mystery in Deleuze’s choice of suicide by defenestration, that appears to have haunted many of those who knew him. Dosse writes:

His circle of friends watched fearfully as it became harder and harder for Deleuze to continue living; they were dreading his death. Yet suicide was so incongruent with Deleuze’s embodiment of a vital force and his philosophy of life that certain of his friends tried to see it as a send off, an ultimate final act. (Dosse 498)

This tells a reader little: suicide would seem to be, by definition, “an ultimate final act,” and perhaps even “a send off.” Dosse also quotes Deleuze’s colleague René Schérer:
I believe we can only speak philosophically about the death of Gilles Deleuze, who will keep his secret for all eternity. It was certainly not from any despair, or death wish, as he had always found this expression and even the idea of a “death drive,” made so popular by psychoanalysis, to be aberrant and contradictory. Deleuze’s whole philosophy is a hymn to life, an affirmation of life (Dosse 498).

Oddly no one, among Deleuze’s friends and commentators, appears to have noticed in the nearly twenty years since his suicide this correlation of dates, between the textual 4 November of Alice’s passage from “up in the window” “through the looking glass” and the actual 4 November of Deleuze’s passage from up in the window through the vertical plane formed by the window frame in his apartment. Nor, needless to say, has there been any consideration of what this correlation might suggest out of both the role played by “the puzzled child” Alice in Logique du sens, and the relations explored by Deleuze through “the Stoics” as the other character series in the same work: between bodies and incorporeals, between Chronos and Aiôn, and between sense and paradox. André Pierre Colombat has written a survey article that gives detail on the circumstances Deleuze’s death, and of reaction to it, called “November 4, 1995: Deleuze’s Death as an Event.” It even tells what floor Deleuze’s apartment was on (the third: though whether this is in French or American terms is not clear). Colombat (like Dosse) also points out that 4 November, 1995 was the date Yitzhak Rabin was assassinated in Israel (Colombat 237). But Rabin’s assassination was something over which Deleuze had no control, and quite possibly never heard about, whereas he did have control over a choice of date for his suicide, and had also, in Logique du sens, written extensively about Through the Looking Glass. And there is no mention at all of Through the Looking Glass in Colombat’s article or, it appears, anywhere else in association with Deleuze’s death. Yet given the role played by Alice and Through the Looking Glass in Logique du sens, it seems impossible that Deleuze could have been unaware of this relational sense of 4 November.

It is the name “Alice” that, as italicized title, introduces Logique du sens in its opening sentence “Dans Alice comme dans De l’autre côté du miroir, il s’agit d’une catégorie de choses très spéciales: les événements purs...” (Lds 9). It is “Alice’s adventures” (“les aventures d’Alice”), in particular as developed in Through the Looking Glass, that as series provide a narrative vocabulary of “pure events” and paradoxes to resonate with the series formed by the conceptual vocabulary of “the Stoics,” toward a theory of sense-production at the surface in what Deleuze
calls “[un] monde fourmillant des singularités anonymes et nomades, impersonnelles, pre-individuelles” (Lds 125). It is the Alice of Through the Looking Glass who provides, in the fifth chapter, the scenario of the “sheep’s shop” (la boutique de la brebis) that enables Deleuze to illustrate his model of divergent series set resonating by a paradoxical element: “la complémentarité de ‘l’étagère vide’ et de ‘la chose brillante qui se trouve toujours au-dessus,’ de la place sans occupant et de l’occupant sans place” (Lds 56). And it is Alice of Through the Looking Glass who provides Deleuze of 1969 with the basis for the following sentence:

Et, de sa hauteur, Alice appréhende le miroir comme surface pure, continuité du dehors et du dedans, du dessus et du dessous, de l’endroit et de l’envers, où Jabberwacky s’étale dans les deux sens à la fois. (Lds 275)

Deleuze did not credit the importance of individual mental states: instead, he credited David Hume for having “constituted a multifarious world of experience based upon the principle of the exteriority of relations” (ES 10). What is to be learned from “the exteriority of relations” in terms of resonance between the series “Gilles Deleuze” and the series “Alice,” as read by Deleuze in Logique du sens via Through the Looking Glass? “Alice elle-même entre dans le jeu,” the text of 1969 records: “elle appartient à la surface de l’échiquier qui a pris le relais du miroir, et se lance dans l’entreprise de devenir reine” (Lds 275)” The verb “se lance” has multiple meanings: Alice embarks on / Alice throws herself into the enterprise of becoming queen. Gilles Deleuze, as bodily, also “threw himself” (se lança) through the vertical plane of a window frame, which was – as for Alice – soon replaced by a horizontal plane: for her, as incorporeal, the giant chessboard; for Deleuze, as corporeal, a paved sidewalk. He did so on the day-of-the-month date that in textual Chronos terms is always the date, reactivated each time the book is read, when Alice goes “through the looking glass.” Early in Logique du sens, Deleuze of 1969 declares that in going through the looking glass, Alice “releases (dégage) her incorporeal double” (Lds 20). And it is in this release that Alice acquires the option of “becoming queen”: that is, to recall the fragment from Heraclitus quoted by Deleuze in Nietzsche et la philosophie, of attaining to the “royal power” identified as “a child’s.”

What therefore does seem possible is that, in keeping with the investment in paradox that pervades Logique du sens, the specific terms of Deleuze’s act of suicide – 4 November, “up in the window,” going through the vertical plane defined by the window frame, becoming
incorporeal – did constitute an affirmation, by him, within the context of his textual record, and of *Logique du sens* in particular. Out of his disinterest in individual mental states, Deleuze would seem to ask that the terms of this act be regarded both from the outside, and relationally. The relationality, however, would seem legitimately to involve his earlier texts. So it is surely plausible to suggest that in structuring his suicide as he did, Deleuze repeated with difference, on a 4 November anniversary in actual time of the textual date of *Through the Looking Glass*, and in a singular instance (or event) that was his own last instant (Aiôn) as an individuated human, Alice’s beginning account to the black kitten of being “up in the window” and her then going through a framed surface. In her case, it was – and in the Chronos time of textuality perennially is – the vertical surface plane of the looking glass. In his case it was the incorporeal plane of space within the window frame. In the vocabulary of phenomenology – the phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty and “one’s own” – Deleuze thereby extinguished his own present: the subjectivity of Gilles Deleuze, the infinitesimally thin layer of Aiôn’s activated surface, leaving in his own case, too, a Chronos present of textuality, spreading out into a future in which it can always be stated, by convention in the present tense: “Deleuze says...” or “Deleuze writes.”

Did Deleuze “choose” this date? Again, this is a term of awareness and intentionality. The correlation exists. What is to be made of it?

Deleuze of 1969 gives this in *Logique du sens* which, perhaps like many passages in the book, reads differently when these terms of Deleuze’s suicide reverberate back on it, as precisely the text associated with Alice and *Through the Looking Glass*, and as also the book where Deleuze sought to develop “a theory of sense” out of the paradoxical dynamic of sense and non-sense.

La question devient: quels sont ces rapports expressifs des événements entre eux? ... [Ce] ne sont pas des rapports de cause à effet, mais un ensemble de correspondances non causales, formant un système d’échos, de reprises et de résonances, un système de signes, bref une quasi-causalité expressive, non pas du tout un causalité nécessitante. (*Lds* 198-199)

With the terms of his suicide, Deleuze made for / set in motion / activated a new “système d’échos, de reprises et de résonances” in relation to the multiple series Alice, *Through the Looking Glass*, *Logique du sens* (with its own thirty-four series that define it), and the Alice and
Through the Looking Glass of *Logique du sens*, some of whose passages subsequently indeed speak in a different register: such as, from the “vingt-et-unième série de l’événement”:

Ou bien la morale n’a aucun sens, ou bien c’est cela qu’elle veut dire, elle n’a rien d’autre à dire: ne pas être indigne de ce qui nous arrive. (*Lds* 174)

The very possibility that the terms of Deleuze’s suicide can, through the shared traits November 4 / “up in the window” / through a vertical plane, be read relationally with these multiple series suggests that he was not, in making for such activation of a new “system of echos, of reprises, and of resonance,” unworthy of that which had come to him, in the way of illness, out of that expressive univocity of being regarding which Dionysos is “the god of affirmation” (*Cc* 130) and whose throws of the dice – chance and necessity – are a game likewise to be affirmed.

As Alice in *Alice’s Adventures* gets larger than she was and smaller than she becomes, Alice in *Logique du sens* has an existence almost as paradoxical, appearing, disappearing for many pages, then reappearing, on each occasion slightly reconfigured as conceptual, and so slightly more Deleuze’s as well as Lewis Carroll’s. But the 4 November / “up in the window” / through-a-vertical plane relation can also be approached in terms of what the textual Deleuze of *Logique du sens* calls, in the “quinzième série des singularités” the “principal characteristics” of a “world swarming with anonymous and nomadic singularities that are impersonal and pre-individual” (*Lds* 125). Three of these, along with a fourth qualifying point from the “sixième série sur la mise en séries,” are given here in summary list:

1) “les singularités-événements correspondent à des séries hétérogènes qui s’organisent en un système ni stable ni instable, mais “métastable,” pourvu d’une énergie potentielle où se distribuent les différences entre séries ...”;

2) “les singularités jouissent d’un processus d’auto-unification toujours mobile et déplacé dans la mesure où un élément paradoxal parcourt et fait résonner les séries”;

3) “... la surface est le lieu du sens: les signes restent dépourvus de sens tant qu’ils n’entrent pas dans l’organisation de surface qui assure la résonance entre deux séries (deux images-signes, deux photos ou deux pistes, etc.)” (*Lds* 125-127; italics in the text); and
Deleuze of 1969 can be ambiguous about the relation “singularity” – “event”:

Qu’est-ce qu’un événement idéal? C’est une singularité. Ou plutôt c’est un ensemble de singularités, de points singuliers qui caractérisent une courbe mathématique, un état de choses physique, une personne psychologique et morale. 

(*Lds 67*)

But the point is that both are constituted not as bodies but as incorporeals that play in series along, or on, a surface, and so produce *sense*.

Deleuze’s inner state, mental awareness, and intent, in the moments before his suicide, are all beyond reach of indisputable discernment, and would be of no interest to Deleuze as a philosopher of the “exteriority of relations.” What can be said, however, is that by performing his suicide how and when he did (4 November / “up in the window” / through-a-vertical-plane), Deleuze *acted*, as his last act, in a way that would establish this pattern of homology in the virtual. It is actualized – or perhaps actualizes itself (*s’actualise*) – in being noticed and rendered textual, thereby making for a new surface. It is across this surface, operating in the realm of incorporeal sense, that the especially distinctive crossover connection of 4 November – “the paradoxical instance” or “quasi-cause” (for Deleuze indeed uses the terms interchangeably on page 196 of *Logique du sens*) – can begin to assure the resonance, in a new way, between the series of singularities known as “Gilles Deleuze,” and the series of singularities (or pure events) known as Alice in *Alice Through the Looking Glass and What She Found There*. At the very least this re-viewing of the terms of Deleuze’s demise would seem to complement its depiction by Alain Beaulieu, in the essay “Deleuze et les stoïciens,” in terms of “son suicide rationnel,” indicative of “son adhésion aux valeurs stoïciennes” (Beaulieu 50). For these terms would also seem to be (as including 4 November / “up in the window” / through a vertical plane) indicative of “son adhésion aux valeurs *De l’autre côté du miroir*,” as well as illustrative of his own theory of the production of sense through divergent series traversed by a “paradoxical instance” that sets them resonating. Again: a kind of affirmation.
Surely there can be few if any philosophers who have so successfully carried an approach to philosophy to the terms of a chosen death.

And likewise: the resonance of two “heterogeneous series,” Gilles Deleuze and Alice, produced by 4 November as the date in time of the former’s suicide, and the date in text of the latter’s passage “through the looking glass,” makes Logique du sens itself resonate in a different way yet again. For it is the text in Deleuze’s œuvre in which, and through which, the series 4 November / “up in the window” / through a vertical plane (for date is not the only commonality) acquires sense. Even as this series functions also as “the paradoxical instance” that cuts across (parcourt) the series Alice and the series Gilles Deleuze in their distinctive events of passage. But the terms of Alice’s passage through the vertical plane of the looking glass also carry in a new direction the claim in Différence et répétition that “l’enfant se construit sur une double série” (132), and gives especially a new twist to Deleuze’s elaboration, in Différence et répétition of the “double series” (corporeal/incorporeal) and the “figure 8” of Henri Maldiney.

How big is the “8,” and how big its crossing? If this image is carried over, then it might be suggested that, for Alice, “le croisement du 8,” as the point of contact between “le cercle des objets réels et celui des objets ou foyers virtuels” is the imprint of her passage through the vertical plane of the looking glass, from one “foyer” – in her case one world – into the other, thereby both “releasing her incorporeal double,” and losing her “personal identity” in the ego (le moi) (Lds 11). John Tenniel’s 1871 rendering of this passage, included in the first edition of Through the Looking Glass, is shown in Appendix B. And likewise: Deleuze effected, through the structured terms of his suicide, a “croisement du 8” as passage, through a vertical plane. Like Alice’s fictional one it was framed, but it had not, as with hers, the appearance of a physical surface. His, as the invisible plane within the frame, through which he could pass as easily as Alice through the surface of the mirror in the John Tenniel drawing, was both virtual (real without being actual) and incorporeal (as not bodily, but having sense). It was this through which he launched himself bodily on Alice’s day Through the Looking Glass, 4 November.

Who was / is Deleuze’s “Alice”? It is Deleuze’s Alice, not strictly Carroll’s “puzzled child,” who “seeks the secret of events and of the becoming unlimited which they imply,” who “disavow[s] ... false depth,” who “discover[s] that everything happens at the border,” in that these are abstract extrapolations from the described experience of Alice in the Adventures and
Through the Looking Glass. But “the puzzled child” Alice is not the ungendered “child” of Différence et répétition. She is an imagined “petite fille” / “little girl,” and the sexuality of “la petite fille” is at issue throughout Logique du sens, both through Alice’s relation to Lewis Carroll – who is described by Deleuze as “pervers sans crime, pervers non subversif, bègue et gaucher” (Lds 284) – and through a likewise recurring concern with “the phallus.” For Deleuze, however,

le phallus ne joue pas le rôle d’un organe, mais celui d’image particulière projetée sur [la zone génitale] privilégiée, aussi bien pour la fille que pour le garçon. ... [Le phallus] ne doit pas s’enfoncer mais, tel un soc qui s’adresse à la mince couche fertile de la terre, il trace une ligne à la surface. (Lds 233, 235)

This is the phallus as itself incorporeal, and equated by Deleuze precisely with:

“l’élément paradoxal ou l’objet = x, manquant toujours à on propre équilibre, excès et défaut à la fois, ... toujours déplacé par rapport à lui même: signifiant flottant et signifié flotté, place sans occupant et occupant sans place, case vide ... C’est lui qui fait résonner les deux séries... (Lds 265)

But such resonance involving the phallus is, paradoxically as might be expected, for Deleuze desexualized: the phallus traces a line, it does not penetrate. In a remarkable paragraph, Deleuze of Logique du sens writes:

En d’autres termes, le caractère positif, hautement affirmatif, de la désexualisation consiste en ceci: que l’investissement spéculatif remplace la régression psychique. Ce qui n’empêche pas que l’investissement spéculatif ne porte sur un objet sexuel, puisqu’il dégage l’événement, et pose l’objet comme concomitant de l’ événement correspondant: qu’est-ce qu’une petite fille? (Lds 278)

When Logique du sens was published in 1969, Deleuze was himself, out of his 1956 marriage to Fanny Grandjouan, the father of a boy, Julien, born in 1960, and of “a little girl,” Émilie, born in 1964. The mystery of this question was therefore directly proximate, even as it was exemplified textually by the vexed series relations Charles Dodgson / Alice Liddell and Lewis Carroll / Alice. Configuring the novel in terms of passage from “la surface physique où se jouent les symptomes et se décident les éffectuations” to “la surface métaphysique où se dessine, se joue l’événement
pur” (*Lds* 277), Deleuze tells his reader rather cryptically that the question “qu’est-ce qu’une petite fille?” would require:

toute une œuvre, non pas pour répondre à cette question, mais pour évoquer et composer l’unique événement qui en fait une question. L’artiste n’est pas seulement le malade et le médecin de la civilisation, c’en est aussi le pervers. (*Lds* 278)

An entire work might likewise be needed to consider this paragraph, whose sequence of abstract nouns of category, demanding to follow, has near its centre a blunt, and perhaps for readers charged question: “qu’est-ce qu’une petite fille”? It also concludes: “L’artiste n’est pas seulement le malade et le médecin de la civilisation, c’en est aussi le pervers.” The question can be asked: in writing this paragraph did Deleuze have access to the photographs – the inscribed physical surfaces – made of the pre-pubescent Alice Liddell by Charles Dodgson, and of the two together? This intra-paragraphal pairing of charged nouns – “petite fille” / “pervers” -- appears in the next to last paragraph of the next to last series: “trente-troisième série des aventures d’Alice” (*Lds* 273). For it is to Alice that Deleuze – as textual incorporeal in the present tense – returns just near the end of *Logique du sens*. The last series, “trente-quatrième série de l’ordre primaire et de l’organisation secondaire,” returns to “the phallus”:

il est certain que, tout comme la surface physique est une préparation de la surface métaphysique, l’organisation sexuelle est une préfiguration de l’organisation du langage. ... L’organisation sexuelle nous présente déjà tout un système point-ligne-surface; et le phallus comme objet = x et mot = x a le rôle du non-sens distribuant le sens aux deux séries sexuelles de base, pré-génitale et œdipienne. (*Lds* 282)

Deleuze in these ways distributes “the phallus” as “paradoxical element,” that which sets series “resonating,” even as it is also de-sexualized. Or is it? A next paragraph on perversion and *Verleugnung* (denial) culminates in a description of Lewis Carroll partly quoted already. This is an aphoristic Deleuze, who has learned from Nietzsche and, it would appear, from Carroll’s photographs:
Ainsi Carroll, pervers sans crime, pervers non subversif, bègue et gaucher, se sert de l’énergie désexualisé de l’appareil photographique comme d’un œil effroyablement spéculatif pour investir l’objet sexuel par excellence, la petite fille-phallus. (*Lds* 284)

Perhaps an ultimate paradox: Is “the little girl-phallus” “the sexual object *par excellence*”? Or only from the point of view of Charles Dodgson (Lewis Carroll)? In the final paragraph of *Logique du sens*, via another compressed passage, Deleuze suggests a scenario, whose sheer exoticism demands quotation in full:

> Il faut imaginer un tiers stoïcien, un tiers Zen, un tiers Carroll: d’une main se masturbant en un geste de trop, de l’autre écrivant sur le sable les paroles magiques de l’événement pur ouvertes à l’univoque, « *Mind – I believe – is Essence – Ent – Abstract – that is – an Accident – which we – that is to say – I meant – » faisant ainsi passer l’énergie de la sexualité à l’asexuel pure, ne cessant pourtant pas de demander « qu’est-ce qu’une petite fille? » quitte à substituer à cette question le problème d’une œuvre d’art à faire, qui seule y répondra. (*Lds* 290)

The italicized portion in English evokes the voice of Carroll.4

It is in this way, at the end of *Logique de sens*, that the question “qu’est-ce qu’une petite fille?” is reintroduced and reinvested with incompleteness, in the context of a volatile image: “a third Stoic, a third Zen, a third Carroll, with one hand masturbating in a gesture of excess, with the other writing on the sand the magic words of an event open to the univocal.” This three-faced figure certainly invites being gendered male: neither Stoicism nor Zen has a tradition of female sages. Deleuze was male, and in 1969 the father of “a little girl” (and an older boy). Twenty six years later, and very ill, he from “up in the window” – a specific and actual window at 84, Avenue Niel, Paris XVII – flung himself through the incorporeal vertical plane of its framed rectangle on 4 November, 1995. What seems plausible to suggest, out of these observed correlations with the passage of Alice “through the looking glass,” and so with the release of “her incorporeal double,” is that “the work of art yet to come, that alone will give an answer” to the question “what is a little girl?” was given a form by the terms Deleuze chose for his suicide. These as much as ask to be read through terms bequeathed by Deleuze himself, that include this
persistent question. The fact that Deleuze re-framed it – “what is a little girl?” – at the end of Logique du sens, suggests its importance to him, and the likelihood that, on 4 November, 1995, he was not insensible to the date’s significance. But either way, the relation exists as the kind of problematic associated by Deleuze with the “world of sense” as cross-referenced, in Logique du sens, with “le monde fourmillant des singularités anonymes et nomades, impersonnelle, pré-individuelles,” via whose opening “nous foulons enfin le champ transcendantal” (Lds 125).

As will be seen, Deleuze returned to Logique du sens’ “very complex” question of “le champ transcendantal” (Lds 128) in his last work, the essay “L’Immanence: une vie,” published in September, 1995 two months before his suicide. And as will be seen, too, with consideration of L’oiseau philosophie, published posthumously in 1997 with drawings by Jacqueline Duhême, Deleuze was in communication with a real little girl, his grand-daughter Lola, before he died. But the question also suggests itself: with the timing and manner of his own last “coup de dés,” was Deleuze, was Deleuze, as a persistently understated humourist, suggesting a hope – a secret longing– for an afterlife of the sort encountered precisely by “the little girl” Alice as incorporeal, behind the plane of the looking glass, on the plane of the chessboard?

Again, this becomes a matter of unknowable inner states. Meanwhile, however, the horizontal plane that Deleuze encountered corporeally, as pavement, on 4 November, 1995, surely made for its own, and different, pattern of resonance with the Idea “enfant” / “child” as it differentiates in Deleuze’s œuvre. It did so in the instant of impact, and through whatever bodily lacerations and disfigurement accompanied his death, for these in retrospect and on consideration in this context resonate precisely with “la lacération dionysiaque” as one of “les éléments du mythe de Dionysos,” as Deleuze recounts it in Nietzsche et la philosophie. For as Deleuze of 1962 there puts it: Dionysos after a death involving “lacération” is indeed reborn as “Dionysos-enfant:” “Déméter apprend qu’elle pourra enfanter Dionysos à nouveau” (Np 15). Deleuze also there reminds his reader, however, that according to Nietzsche in Die Geburt der Tragödie “cette résurrection de Dionysos est seulement interprétée comme ‘la fin de l’individuation’” (Np 15).

Gilles Deleuze, in the performance of his last act on 4 November, left behind in “the virtual” terms of relation with Alice of Through the Looking Glass and with the “pure events” described therein, as set on a fictional 4 November. He also repeated, with difference, both the narrative beginning in being “up in the window” and the passage through a framed plane. For Alice this plane was, and with each reading is, the looking glass; for Deleuze, it was the incorporeal plane enclosed by a physical window frame. This was how the philosopher, by then barely able to breathe, never mind write, and attached to an oxygen machine to help him breathe (Dosse 497), chose to enact his death. In the paradoxical instant in Aiôn of passing through an incorporeal planar surface, and yet before subjection to the force of gravity, the series Gilles Deleuze resonated most intensely with the series Alice-going-through-the-looking-glass.

Did Deleuze unhook himself from his breathing-machine before he crossed the vertical plane? That this question merits asking is out of resonance with another differenciation – and another repetition inhabited by difference – of “enfant” / “child” in Deleuze’s œuvre: the next after Alice in temporal terms, and also the next after Alice as, for a reader, prominent.

In 1969, the year Logique du sens was published, Gilles Deleuze was introduced to Félix Guattari, a student of Jacques Lacan, and psychiatric practitioner at the clinic of La Borde outside Paris. In a 1977 dialogue with Claire Parnet, Deleuze described what this meant for him:

Ma rencontre avec Félix Guattari a changé bien des choses. Félix avait déjà un long passé politique, et de travail psychiatrique. Il n’était pas “philosophe de formation,” mais il avait d’autant plus un devenir-philosophe, et beaucoup d’autres devenirs. ... J’essayais dans mes livres précédents de décrire un certain exercice de la pensée; mais le décrire, ce n’était pas encore exercer la pensée de cette façon-là. (D 23)

Deleuze, then, had run up against the limits of “describing.” “Crier ‘vive le multiple,’” he wrote to Parnet with implicit reference to Différence et répétition, “ce n’est pas encore le faire, il faut faire le multiple.” And likewise, with implicit reference to Logique du sens and its quasi-novel status: “il ne suffit pas non plus de dire: ‘à bas les genres,’ il faut écrire effectivement de telle façon qu’il n’y ait plus de “genres”... Voilà que, avec Félix, tout cela devenait possible...” (D 23)
Dosse is blunter about the extent of the crisis at which Deleuze had arrived with the completion of Logique du sens, the book that closed out the first phase of his work:

Meeting Guattari revitalized Deleuze. He received Guattari at his home in Limousin, where he was convalescing after a serious operation a year earlier: his tubercular lung had been removed; from then on he suffered from chronic respiratory difficulties. He was also becoming an alcoholic … (Dosse 3)

Among the tensions in Logique du sens is that between Deleuze’s reading of Lewis Carroll, as producer of the Alice stories, and his reading of Antonin Artaud (1896-1948), who was diagnosed schizophrenic and institutionalized for much of the last ten years of his life. The tension extends to the theme, precisely, of “the child.” And how Deleuze of 1969 articulates this tension with reference to “the child” both indicates the dilemma he found himself in, and points ahead to the terms of this work with Guattari.

In the thirteenth series of Logique du sens, called “du schizophrène et de la petite fille” (Lds 101), Deleuze signals frustration with a psychoanalysis that contents itself with “designating cases, manifesting histories, or signifying complexes,” and declares that psychoanalysis is “psychanalyse du sens. Elle est géographique avant d’être historique” (Lds 113). Harkening back to the terms of passive and active synthesis introduced in Différence et répétition, but with different vocabulary, he distinguishes between the “ordre primaire de la schizophrénie” linked with Artaud, in which “le langage est entièrement résorbé dans la profondeur béante,” and “l’organisation de surface que nous appelons secondaire,” linked with Carroll, where “les corps physiques et le mots sonores sont séparés et articulés à la foi par une frontière incorporelle” (Lds 111). These are, Deleuze insists, “d’autre pays”: “Artaud n’est pas Carroll ni Alice, Carroll n’est pas Artaud, Carroll n’est même Alice” (Lds 113). But worth noting is that there are three figures mentioned here, among whom Deleuze has also just distinguished in terms of their relation to “surface”: “la conquête de la surface chez l’enfant, et la faillite de la surface chez le schizophrène, et la maîtrise des surfaces chez celui qu’on appelle – par exemple – pervers” (Lds 112).

A reader is reminded, again, that Alice (as incorporeal) becomes Queen. But she is also implicitly presented, in this three-part sequence reminiscent of “the story of the three metamorphoses,” as apart from “the schizophrenic” (Artaud) and the “pervert” (Carroll). Both
Artaud and Carroll, however, are given by Deleuze their own relation to “the child” (“l’enfant” italicized in French), in such a way as to make the term stand out and render it problematical. Deleuze of 1969 states,

> enfonce l’enfant dans une alternative extrêmement violente, conforme aux deux langages en profondeur, de passion et d’action corporelles: ou bien que l’enfant ne naisse pas, c’est-à-dire ne sorte pas des boîtes de son épine dorsale à venir, sur laquelle les parents forniquent (le suicide à rebours) – ou bien qu’il se fasse un corps fluidique et glorieux, flamboyant, sans organes et sans parents (comme celles qu’Artaud appelait ses “filles” à naitre). (Lds 113)

This scenario of Artaud’s relation to “the child” (italicized) Deleuze contrasts directly with Carroll’s relation to “the child” (likewise italicized in the text):

> Carroll au contraire attend l’enfant, conformément à son langage du sens incorporel: il attend au point et au moment où l’enfant a quitté les profondeurs du corps maternel, pas encore découvert la profondeur de son propre corps, court moment de surface où la petite fille affleure l’eau, comme Alice dans le bassin de ses propres larmes. (Lds 114)

The predatory dimension of “pervers sans crime,” projected incorporeally, projected incorporeally, can rarely have been put with more eloquence, even as this depiction of victimhood is associated with Alice in only one of her moments, and from the first book: “like Alice in the pool of her own tears” in Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland. Which “child” fares worse in these juxtaposed scenarios, Artaud’s or Carroll’s, would be difficult to say. Nevertheless, Deleuze writes, “ce sont d’autres pays, d’autres dimensions sans rapport. ... Carroll et Artaud ne se rencontrent pas pour autant” (Lds 114). And precisely here is the revelation: “seul le commentateur peut changer de dimension, et c’est sa grande faiblesses, le signe qu’il n’en habite aucune” (Lds 114). This announces the impasse of “description”: in acknowledging “the great weakness” of “the commentator,” Deleuze in 1969 as much as signaled readiness for a radical experiment of commitment, and also the terms for it: toward Artaud and “depth,” away from Carroll and “mastery of surfaces.”
A quirk in the English translation of this passage helps to foreground, improbably and even with inadvertent comedy, a direction this investment would take, in regard to differentiations of “enfant” / “child.” Deleuze’s description of Artaud’s “child” reads in French: “ou bien qu’il se fasse un corps fluidique et glorieux, flamboyant, sans organes et sans parents.” The Lester/Stivale translation, however, gives “or she creates a fluid, glorious, and flamboyant body without organs and without parents” (LoS 93). A concern with gender balance is understandable, but here, surely, at best the neutral “it” can be justified. Deleuze has just introduced the term “corps sans organes,” which he carries over from Artaud’s 1947 radio play Pour en finir avec le Jugement de Dieu (where it is introduced in with the phrase “dieu / et avec dieu, / ses organes” [Artaud 13]). It will figure immensely in Deleuze’s work with Guattari, and he “reconstitutes” it via the encounter of Alice with Humpty Dumpty in Through the Looking Glass (Lds 111): “Et dans l’opposition d’Alice et de Humpty Dumpty, on peut toujours reconnaître les deux pôles ambivalents ‘organes morcelés – corps sans organes,’ corps passoire et corps glorieux” (Lds 113).

Alice, correlated by Deleuze with “fragmented organs” in a way very different from the John Tenniel drawings exemplified in Appendices B and C, is not correlated with the “body without organs.” Humpty Dumpty is so correlated. And Carroll’s Humpty Dumpty is decidedly male:

> However, the egg only got larger and larger, and more and more human: when she had come within a few yards of it, she saw that it had eyes and a nose and mouth; and when she had come close to it, she saw clearly that it was HUMPTY DUMPTY himself. (Carroll, 1871 VI; capitalization in the text)

Deleuze himself explicitly wrote the pronoun “il,” not “elle,” in association with Artaud’s “child.” The translators’ adjustment of the pronoun, therefore, disallows Deleuze’s own provision – perhaps “inadvertent,” perhaps not – of a subtle directional arrow as to how his and Guattari’s terms of engagement with Artaud’s “child,” rather than Deleuze’s engagement alone with Carroll’s “child” as the female Alice, would proceed.

This moment in translation is pointed out because since 1990, and the appearance of the standard English translation of Logique du sens by Lester and Stivale, the English-language reader has been denied the option of noticing in this passage a sense of germination of the primary image of “schizoanalysis” developed by Deleuze and Guattari in L’Anti-Œdipe in terms of a boy-child.
Instead, the provision of “she” for “il” in the description of Artaud’s “child” hints, unjustifiably given Deleuze’s choice of “il,” at continuity with Alice, as “the little girl.” The passage as written in French by Deleuze anticipates, and perhaps helps explain the eruption in *L’Anti-Œdipe*, as his first collaboration with Guattari in 1972, of the image of a boy-child at the book’s outset. The pronoun “il” used by Deleuze to describe Artaud’s “child” can indeed be given as “it,” but can also be given as “he.” As for the concluding parenthesized passage “comme celle qu’Artaud appelait ses ‘filles’ à naître” (*Lds* 114), this is a simile. Like them. But not them.

What is this image, that seems to call for such retrospective singling out of the pronoun “il”? Given technology, there seems little point to inconveniencing the reader by sending it only to an appendix. Below is how it appears opposite the start of the first chapter in *L’Anti-Œdipe* (1972). Deleuze and Guattari describe it in this way seven pages into the French text: “Un tableau de Richard Lindner, *Boy with Machine*, montre un énorme et turgide enfant, ayant greffé, faisant fonctionner une de ses petites machines désirantes sur une grosse machine sociale technique (car, nous le verrons, c’est déjà vrai de l’enfant)” (*A-Œ 13*).

The image does not face the first page of the first chapter in the English translation of 1977, but rather introduces the entire book opposite the title page. The visual fields produced by these different juxtapositions are shown in Appendix C.

This is not Alice.

The abstract “child” of *Différence et répétition* has already carried over in *Logique du sens* via the distinction between primary order and secondary organization, which maps back to the distinction between passive and active synthesis, with the unconscious (the Id) a “lieu mobile, un ‘çà et là’ des excitations et de leur résolutions” (*Der* 128). The new term in the description of the Lindner painting is “machines,” and specifically “desiring
machines,” which in the French L’Anti-Œdipe is introduced directly opposite the black and white reproduction of Boy with Machine, described as oil on canvas, forty by thirty inches, date 1954.5

Under the title “chapitre 1 / les machines désirantes,” the French reads:

Ça fonctionne partout, tantôt sans arrêt, tantôt discontinu. Ça respire, ça chauffe, ça mange. Ça chie, ça baise. Quelle erreur d’avoir dit le ça. Partout ce sont des machines, pas du tout métaphoriquement: des machines de machines, avec leurs couplages, leurs connexions. Une machine-organe est branchée sur une machine-source: l’une émet un flux, que l’autre coupe. Le sein est une machine qui produit du lait, et la bouche, une machine couplée sur celle-là... (A-Œ 7; italics in text)

This is, on some level, difference resubordinated to a single concept: that of the machine, cross-referenced with the pronoun “ça.” Both appear seven times in this introductory excerpt. In fact, the word “machine” appears fifteen times in the opening paragraph.

Clearly, there is thus an instant linkage at the book’s outset, for the French-language reader, of these repeated terms – “ça” and “machine” – with a single image, shortly to be described as of “un énorme et turgide enfant, ayant greffé.” (The English translation gives “a huge, pudgy, bloated boy” [A-O 7], which seems to ignore the adjective “greffé,” as suggesting a transplanted composite).

In Logique du sens, the figure of “the little girl” Alice, given an age of seven and a half by Carroll for Through the Looking Glass, is introduced by name as the second word in the first paragraph of the first series in French, and as the first word in the English; she is quickly linked with the surface, and with production of sense through paradox at the surface. In the French edition of L’Anti-Œdipe, the image of the little boy, of indeterminate age, pudgy and grotesquely proportioned, is holding in his two hands a small machinic device defined by lines and angles, and connected by a line to a larger machine in the background. The figure of the boy, within the three-dimensional illusion of the two-dimensional surface, is between the two machines. But there is also a visual relation, in the French, of surfaces: between the image as a whole, and the text on the page opposite, with its repetitions of the words “machine” and “ça,” and with the latter, in French, linked with the Freudian unconscious or Id. This establishes,
therefore, in immediate terms (though for the French-language reader only) two triadic sets of relations: first the grotesquely proportioned boy-child, with his own relation, inside the image, to the big and little machines; and secondly the image itself (boy-child and machines) to the multiple repetitions, in the juxtaposed text, of the words “machine” and “ça.” The English-language reader loses out on two counts, getting neither the juxtaposition of the image with the opening paragraph and its repetitions, nor the word “ça” as, in French, identifiable with the unconscious. The English-language reader gets “It is at work everywhere...,” “It breathes....” and so on. The connection through identity of sound – “ça” – is effaced.

Thus is an alternative to Alice provided from the outset in *L’Anti-Oedipe*, in the form of an image of a boy-child, triangulated in terms of a background big machine (that Deleuze and Guattari describe as “a vast technical social machine” (*A-O* 7) and “one of his little desiring-machines,” that he is holding. This provides also a visual model, in somewhat comic terms, for transformation of the abstract “child,” carried over for Deleuze from *Différence et répétition* and, to an extent, from *Logique du sens*, away from the model passive synthesis → active synthesis with multiple larval egos → formation of the ego in the crossing of the figure 8, to a model that as much as exalts the unconscious as a machine of “desiring production.” The abstract “child,” however, is still retained for the sake of castigating psychoanalysis in terms of its “Oedipalizing” “triangle papa-maman-moi” (*A-Œ* 60), with the term “Oedipus” ceasing to refer – as for Deleuze with respect in *Différence et répétition* – to Sophocles’ Oedipus (*Der* 36) – and becoming a term of derision: “a dependency of the paranoiac territoriality” and “the index of reactionary investment” (*A-O* 278, 366). How much of this shift is Deleuze, and how much Guattari is impossible to say in precise terms. But it is with Guattari that the term “machine,” while introduced in terms of “the machine to affirm chance” in *Nietzsche et la philosophie*, and the “Dionysiac machine” in *Logique du sens* (*Np* 35, *Lds* 130), goes into high gear, so to speak. And Dosse indeed asserts that for Guattari, “his idea of the machine” was an early interest, quoting his notebook from Jacques Lacan’s 1954-55 lecture course: “There are unconscious manifestations of the subject as an individual-machine that require special treatment if they are to be reintroduced into reality” (Dosse 39, n. 70 530).

Perhaps it is fair to say that such “special treatment” took place when Guattari met Deleuze, and this vocabulary mingled with an approach to ontology that already affirmed “pre-individual singularities” and an autoproducive “univocity of being” that speaks in difference and
multiplicities. “Dans les machines désirantes,” they write, “tou fonctionne en même temps, mais dans les hiatus et les ruptures, les pannes et les ratés... la production désirante est multiplicité pure, c’est-à-dire affirmation irréductible à l’unité” (AŒ 42). It might be suggested that, in the writing of L’Anti-Œdipe, Deleuze-Guattari became a rhetorical machine of a particular kind, advocating in the febrile ambience that in the years of the book’s production from 1969 to 1972 was still Paris post-May ’68, when much seemed possible. The tone of the book is relentlessly militant, posing “en termes eschatologiques le problème du rapport final entre la machine analytique, la machine révolutionnaire et les machines désirantes” (AŒ 43). Jerry Aline Flieger describes this tone as inflected with “animus” (Buchanan 221). It can also be mindfulful of the refrain, given as reductio ad absurdum, in Peter Weiss’s 1963 play The Persecution and Assassination of Jean-Paul Marat as Performed by the Inmates of the Asylum of Charenton Under the Direction of the Marquis de Sade, made into a film by Peter Brooks and Adrian Mitchell in 1967: “What’s a revolution, without general copulation, copulation, copulation” (Weiss 77). But there can be no doubt: with L’Anti-Oedipe, Deleuze is no longer the “commentator,” but emphatically committed. Artaud becomes “l'accomplissement de la littérature, précisément parce qu'il est schizophrène et non parce qu'il ne l'est pas.” Lewis Carroll is dismissed as “le lâche des belles-lettres” (AŒ 160).

For Deleuze and Guattari of L’Antique-Œdipe, “tout tourne autour des machines désirantes et de la production de désir” (AŒ 456); they urge that “machines désirantes, techniques et sociales s'épousent dans un processus de production schizophrénique (AŒ 457). “Le schizophrène,” they tell their reader, “est le plus proche du cœur battant de la réalité, à un point intense qui se confond avec la production du réel” (AŒ 104). Asserting that “la société est schizophrénisante au niveau de son infra-structure, de son mode de production, de ses circuits économiques capitalistes les plus précis” (AŒ 433), they call “le schizo ... celui qui échappe à toute référence œdipienne, familiale et personnologique” and advocate for a “processus schizophrénique ... franchir le mur ou la limite qui nous sépare de la production désirante, faire passer les flux de désir” (AŒ 434). Accordingly, they call also for replacement of an Oedipalizing and neuroticizing psychoanalysis with a “schizoanalysis” (“schizo-analyse”) whose “tâche destructrice constante” is

de défaire inlassablement les moi et leurs présupposés, de libérer les singularités prépersonnelles qu'ils enferment et refoulent, de faire couler les flux qu'ils
With this ambition, the image of Boy with Machine that introduces the first chapter of L’Anti-Oedipe in terms of a boy-child, takes on an element of incongruity. For notwithstanding the schizoanalytic program, developed in the book, of “disintegrating the normal ego” and “liberating the prepersonal singularities they enclose and repress” the figure of the boy-child is presented as whole. This is not the dis-integrated portraiture of Pablo Picasso or, for that matter, Francis Bacon. The boy-child’s represented body instead provides an image of wholeness, though “pudgy” and “bloated.” Perhaps this incongruity informed the insertion, by Deleuze-Guattari, of the problematical descriptor “greffé,” that is simply ignored in the English translation. In suggesting that Lindner’s boy is “grafted,” or in some way “transplanted,” are they urging he be seen as paradoxically composite? As multiple? Unfortunately the translation obscures this question, by simply dropping the term.

But this paradox of the boy-child’s visual wholeness in the Lindner painting, declared “greffé” or otherwise, pushes to the foreground another profound and relentlessly troubling paradox: the normalcy – as a style of wholeness – that lay for Gilles Deleuze, as corporeal, behind the provision with Guattari of L’Anti-Oedipe as a surface – and machine – for the advocacy of “disintegrating the normal ego.” For it must be said that even as, with Guattari, Deleuze denounced Lewis Carroll as “the coward of belles-lettres,” and lauded Artaud as “the accomplishment of literature,” he was himself still functioning within the security and structure – however then mutable at Paris VIII – of a university, and drawing a paycheque. He was also, notwithstanding ridicule in L’Anti-Oedipe of “la famille” as the Oedipal “triangle papa-maman-moi” (AŒ 60), raising a family. And thirdly, notwithstanding affirmation in L’Anti-Oedipe of a “schizorevolutionary” process of “delirium” that, with “la tâche destructrice constante de dissoudre le moi dit normal ... suit les lignes de fuite du désir ... de faire passer les flux déterritorialisés du désir” (AŒ 434, 329), he was dividing his time along a line between an apartment in Paris XVII, and a country house via his wife’s family, at St. Léonard de Noblat near Limoges, four hours drive south of Paris (Dosse 107). This was Deleuze as corporeal. But while Deleuze maintained a family life with his wife Fanny and their son and daughter, it perhaps merits noting that Guattari did not live with his ex-wife Nicole, or with sons born in 1958 and 1961 and a daughter born in 1964. Instead, Dosse describes him as “an impenitent womanizer”
who at La Borde, the radical psychiatric clinic where he worked, established “a group ... to root out couples representing ‘horrible conjugality.’” (Dosse 68; quotation Danielle Sivadon).

Dosse also quotes Kostas Axelos addressing Deleuze after *L’Anti-Œdipe*’s publication:

Honorable French professor, good husband, excellent father of two charming children, loyal friend, progressive thinker ... would you want your children and students to model their ‘effective life’ on your life, or, for example, on Artaud’s, who was imitated by so many writers? (Dosse 208)

Like François Châtelet, Axelos was Deleuze’s colleague at the experimental Université de Paris VIII à Vincennes. He had also himself written a book called *Le Jeu du monde*, published in the same year as *Logique du sens* (1969), also by Les Éditions de Minuit, and on “play as the system of systems” (Axelos 20) that recalled Deleuze’s advocacy, in the Nietzsche books, of “Jeu et nouveau commencement” and “Dionysos-enfant.” Axelos also introduced an oppositional perspective analogous to Deleuze’s on “the dogmatic image of thought” as articulated in *Différence et répétition*: “we must not only read, we must play, turning the rules upside down when necessary, experimenting beyond the subject-object dichotomy with a plurality of perspectives on each problem” (Axelos 24).

Nevertheless, Axelos retained the words “man” and “world”: “how do we get back and forth from man’s play and play in the world to world’s play?” (Axelos 23). Both these terms had for Deleuze become problematical, and worthy of radical subversion, in *Différence et répétition*, where he had already written against “the integrity of the self, of the world, and of God,” and of:

*cette schizophrénie de droit qui caractérise la plus haute puissance de la pensée, et qui ouvre directement l’Être sur la différence, au mépris de toutes les médiations, de toutes réconciliations du concept.* (Der 82)

Yet for himself and his family, as corporeal and social, Deleuze maintained a way of life that might well be described as bourgeois and even discreetly bourgeois. Does such disjunction between words and acts matter? Or is it an instance of “disjunctive synthesis” as depicted in *Logique du sens*: “and - and” rather than “either – or,” a paradoxical intersection of divergent series productive of sense? Either way, the commanding presence of *Boy with Machine* in both
L’Anti-Œdipe and Anti-Oedipus, though in different placements, as the only image in either book, makes for an ineradicable visual signifier in the iteration, with difference, of “enfant”/“child” in this collaboration of Deleuze-Guattari. And oddly enough, if there is an image that strikingly resembles Lindner’s Boy with Machine, but doubled, it is John Tenniel’s drawing for *Through the Looking Glass* of Alice meeting Tweedledum and Tweedledee (Carroll 148; Appendix C). Of them, Deleuze of 1969 writes in the thirty-third series of *Logique du sens*, “des aventures d’Alice,” that they are “tellement convergents et continus qu’on ne les distingue pas” (*Lds* 276). This phrase, applied by Deleuze himself, to the indistinguishable cranky schoolboys of *Through the Looking Glass* could indeed carry over verbatim to describe the interwoven authorship of Deleuze-Guattari in *L’Anti-Œdipe*.

And what is to be made of this description of the encounter in *Through the Looking Glass*?

Alice said afterwards that she had never seen such a fuss made about anything in all her life – the way those two bustled about and the quantity of things they put on... (Carroll 158)

There are, perhaps, complex ironies to be drawn from the fact that, at the end, Deleuze-as-corporeal was indeed connected to a machine: a breathing machine, that gave him oxygen, and that was supplied by “the socius.” The question does deserve to be asked and pondered: Did Deleuze make his own last return to *Through the Looking Glass* – and to Alice – with or without the machine?
5. “L’enfant ... monstrueux” in “Lettre à un critique sévère” (1973)

Perhaps the best known instance of “enfant”/“child” in Deleuze’s *œuvre* appears, with paradox and irony, in a letter he wrote after the success of *L’Anti-Œdipe* to Michel Cressole, a doctoral student who had written to him, and who published both his letter and Deleuze’s reply in his book *Deleuze* (1973). Deleuze’s reply, retitled “Lettre à un critique sévère,” was then republished as the first text in *Pourparlers* (1990). In commenting on the obligatory study of the history of philosophy as taught in 1940s France, Deleuze wrote to Cressole:

> Mais, surtout, ma manière de m’en tirer à cette époque, c’était, je crois bien, de concevoir l’histoire de la philosophie comme une sorte d’enculage ou, ce qui revient au même, immaculée conception. Je m’imaginais arriver dans le dos d’un auteur, et lui faire un enfant, qui serait le sien, et qui serait pourtant monstrueux. *(Pp 15)*

This striking image of incorporeal buggery is likely one of the associations that goes with the name “Deleuze” for the unspecialized reader, and almost certainly the one that such a reader would associate with the term “enfant” / “child” in relation to Deleuze. It therefore seems the more important to point out that, with this passage, Deleuze was referring to a particular phase of his philosophical education, which took place in a particular post-war period:

> Je suis d’une génération, une des dernières générations qu’on a plus ou moins assassinée avec l’histoire de la philosophie. L’histoire de la philosophie exerce en philosophie une fonction répressive évidente, c’est l’Œdipe proprement philosophique: “Tu ne vas quand même pas oser parler en ton nom tant que tu n’auras lu ceci et cela, et cela sur ceci, et ceci sur cela.” *(Pp 14)*

Feeling “more or less assassinated with the history of philosophy,” Deleuze devised a method of retaliation, that comes across as at once of love and hate. Of the “monstrous child” conceived, in effect, under the sign of incorporeal buggery, he in his letter to Cressole adds in regard to its other “parent,” the philosopher being buggered:

> Que se soit bien le sien, c’est très important, parce qu’il fallait que l’auteur dise effectivement ce que je lui faisais dire. Mais que l’enfant soit monstrueux, c’était
nécéssaire aussi, parce qu’il fallait passer par toutes sortes de décentrements, glissements, cassements, émissions secrètes qui m’ont fait bien plaisir. (Pp 15)

Perhaps it would be better not to dwell on the precise terms of “émissions secrètes.” Or perhaps one should, given the reference in Logique du sens to “un tiers stoïcien, un tiers Zen, un tiers Carroll: d’une main se masturbant en un geste de trop, de l’autre écrivant sur le sable les paroles magiques de l’événement pur ouvertes à l’univoque” (Lds 289-290), as a means of “making pass the energy of sexuality to the pure asexual”: “ce qui revient au même, immaculée conception.”

It is in this context of depicting how philosophy was taught to his “generation” that Deleuze offers his own (comic) depiction of his response, through the image of “un enfant ... monstrueux.” Accordingly, perhaps this passage might better be read less as continuous with the figure of “enfant” in Deleuze’s œuvre generally than as a (comic) exaggeration of the assessment of the history of philosophy in Différence et répétition:

Il nous semble que l’histoire de la philosophie doit jouer un rôle assez analogue à celui d’un collage dans une peinture. ... (On imagine un Hegel philosophiquement barbu, un Marx philosophiquement glabre au même titre qu’une Joconde moustachue). Il faut arriver à raconter un livre réel de la philosophie passée comme si c’était un livre imaginaire et feint (Der 4).

Deleuze here in effect calls for an approach to the history of philosophy like that opened by Marcel Duchamp in relation to the history of art (via, for example, a moustachioed Mona Lisa or a signed urinal). Tellingly, Deleuze in the letter’s next paragraph writes that “C’est Nietzsche que j’ai lu tard et qui m’a sorti de tout ça. Car c’est impossible de lui faire subir à lui un pareil traitement. Des enfants dans le dos, c’est lui qui vous en fait” (Pp 15).

This being said, clearly Deleuze did continue to “climb on the backs” even of philosophers he admired, giving them “children” recognizable “as theirs,” yet also – from these thinkers’ likely perspectives on their own work – “monstrous.” Would “the Stoics” approve of what Deleuze makes, in Logique du sens, of “their” theories of time and incorporeality? Would Spinoza – he of “Whatever is, is in God” – have approved of Deleuze’s decoupling, in Différence et répétition, of expression, affirmation, and immanence from “God,” and his tying them to a “univocity of being,” extracted from John Duns Scotus and again unhinged from “God”? Indeed, would
Spinoza have approved of Deleuze’s claim that “univocity is the keystone of [his] entire philosophy,” when the word, according to Daniel Smith, does not appear once in Spinoza’s œuvre? Alain Beaulieu has likewise pointed out that “the same can be said about the word ‘expressionism’ that Spinoza barely uses, and that Deleuze sees at the core of Spinoza’s philosophy; similarly, for the notion of ‘immanence,’ Spinoza is presented by Deleuze as the ultimate ‘thinker of immanence,’ but Spinoza never uses the word” (Beaulieu 2013).

This indeed might be called a Duchampian approach to the history of philosophy. Whether “les enfants” thus produced, in this case as Différence et répétition and Logique du sens, are “monstrous” becomes in each case a question of intertextual relationality. Would Nietzsche even have approved of what Deleuze made of “eternal return”? This is impossible to say, and perhaps also, given Deleuze’s depiction of Logique du sens as “un essai de roman logique et psychanalytique,” of limited relevance. Even the image itself is perhaps not so scandalous as in 1972.

In 1980, Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari published their second big collaboration, after *L’Anti-Œdipe* in 1972. Called *Mille Plateaux*, it was part two of *Capitalisme et schizophrénie*, and its fifteen “plateaus,” formed over six hundred pages, are, as with *L’Anti-Œdipe*, at once declarative, polemical, and prescriptive, as per Deleuze’s description of “the philosopher” in *Nietzsche*: “Le philosophe de l’avenir est artiste et médecin, en un mot, législateur” (*N* 17). In this case, it is toward thought and writing called “rhizomatic.” A portrait in three parts can be conveyed via quotation. The first concerns adaptation of the term “rhizome” from botany. As distinguished from “trees and their roots,” the rhizome, for Deleuze-Guattari,

> connecte un point quelconque avec un autre point quelconque, et chacun de ses traits ne renvoie nécessairement à des traits de même nature, il met en jeu des régimes de signes très différents et même des états de non-signes. ... Il n’a pas de commencement ni de fin, mais toujours un milieu ... (*MP* 31)

The term “rhizome” is also relational to the term “plateau,” as per the book’s title:

> une région continue d’intensités, vibrant sur elle-même, et qui se développe en évitant toute orientation sur un point culminant ou vers une fin extérieure. ... Nous appelons “plateau” toute multiplicité connectable avec d’autres par tiges souterraines superficielles, de manière à former et étendre un rhizome. Nous écrivons ce livre comme rhizome. (*MP* 33)

Thirdly, the polemical dimension of *Mille Plateaux* includes a prescriptive concept of “the war machine” as tied both to “writing” and “nomads”:

> L’écriture épouse une machine de guerre et des lignes de fuite, elle abandonne les strates, les segmentarités, la sédentarité, l’appareil d’État. ... Les nomades ont inventé une machine de guerre contre l’appareil d’État. ... Mais le rapport d’une machine de guerre avec le dehors, ce n’est pas un autre “modèle,” c’est un agencement qui fait que la pensée devient elle-même nomade. (*MP* 36)
Rhizome, plateau, war machine: perhaps the three terms of most help to a reader toward engagement with *Mille Plateaux*. Again, there is the tone of militancy, of aggression;

...écrire par slogans: Faites rhizome et pas racine, ne plantez jamais! Ne semez pas, piquez! Ne soyez pas un ni multiple, soyez des multiplicités! Faites la ligne et jamais le point! La vitesse transforme le point en ligne! Soyez rapide, même sur place! Ligne de chance, ligne de hanche, ligne de fuite. (*MP* 36)

Perhaps it is safe to say that Deleuze and Guattari were not thinking of themselves as food-growing gardeners with the exhortation “never plant.” What also seems clear, however, is that just these exhortations, and others by Deleuze-Guattari, have played a part in “rhizomatic” social movements that eschew hierarchy and conventions of identity, that operate as “war machines” in relation to established order, and that strive to “be quick, even when standing still.” Examples that suggest themselves are the Occupy and Idle No More movements, the hacker collective that goes by the name Anonymous, and Pussy Riot in Russia, none of which invest in the “normal ego” whose disintegration Deleuze-Guattari of *L’Anti-Oedipe* declared in 1972 was “the constant destructive task of schizoanalysis” (*A-O* 362). It does not seem necessary to establish cause-effect relationships between these movements and the style and content of *Mille Plateaux* to suggest a relation. Rather this would again seem to be an example of what Deleuze of 1969, in *Logique du sens*, calls “expressive relations of events among themselves”: “not relations of cause and effect, but an ensemble of non-causal correspondences, forming a system of echoes, of reprises, and of resonances, a system of signs, in short, an expressive quasi-causality, and not at all a necessitating causality” (*Lds* 198-199).

The evolving differenciation of “enfant” / “child” in Deleuze’s *œuvre*, which in this case includes Guattari, figures in this machinery of *Mille Plateaux*. Three ways will be considered. They are: 1) “devenir-enfant” as a concept; 2) “devenir-enfant” as depersonalization of memory and childhood; and 3) the concept of incorporeal transformation.

The establishment of “devenir-enfant” as a concept, in the sense of the term that Deleuze will develop in *Qu’est-ce que la philosophie?* (1991), written nominally with Guattari, takes place via a 1980 conversation between Deleuze and Catherine Clément, that accompanied the release of *Mille Plateaux*. Calling the philosopher “quelqu’un qui crée dans l’ordre des concepts, quelqu’un qui invente de nouveaux concepts,” textual Deleuze says:
Les concepts, ce sont des singularités qui réagissent sur la vie ordinaire, sur les flux de pensée ordinaires ou quotidiens. Il y a beaucoup d’essais de concepts dans Mille Plateaux: rhizome, espace lisse, heccéité, devenir-animal, machine abstraite, diagramme, etc. (Drf 162)

In Mille Plateaux, at the end of the “plateau” called “1730 – Devenir-intense, devenir-animal, devenir-imperceptible...” is to be found the following sequential apposition:

...à travers les devenirs-femme, enfant, animal ou molécule, la nature oppose sa puissance, et la puissance de la musique, à celle des machines de l’homme, fracas des usines et des bombardiers. (MP 380)

More could be written about this passage than is possible here, not least concerning “nature” as agency that “opposes its power, and the power of music,” to that of “the machines of man, the fracas of factories and bombers.” But what this series “les devenirs-femme, enfant, animal ou molécule,” seems to imply, considered as kinds of becoming, is that if the pairing “devenir-animal” is a “concept,” as per Deleuze’s description to Clément, then so, too, according to this series, is “devenir-enfant.”

What this signifies within the context of Deleuze’s œuvre can be conveyed only through reference, necessarily brief, to the presentation of philosophy itself that takes place in Qu’est-ce que la philosophie? And here the caveat mentioned in the Introduction is important: Dosse’s claim, in his biography of Deleuze and Guattari, that Qu’est-ce que la philosophie?, as “both a very personal project and something of a crowning moment in a philosopher’s life, ... was manifestly written by Deleuze alone” (Dosse 456). This information is significant not least because Qu’est-ce que la philosophie? does not read like works done by Deleuze with Guattari: it is less polemical and stylistically overwrought, and – like Deleuze’s earlier work – more measured in building argument while still being assertive. It is also, especially in its first three chapters, concerned with philosophy, and specifically with philosophy as the creation of concepts. It is an approach that seems to have developed out of such statements by Deleuze as in a letter of 25 July, 1984 to Kuniichi Uno:

Il me semble que les concepts ont une existence propre, ils sont animés, ce sont des créatures invisibles. Mais justement, ils ont besoin d’être créés. La
philosophie me semble être un art de création, autant que la peinture et la musique: elle crée des concepts. (*Drf* 219).

In developed relation to this assessment of concepts, Deleuze of 1991 presents a tripartite model of “philosophy” summarized in this way toward the end of the third chapter:

La philosophie présente trois éléments dont chacun répond aux deux autres, mais doit être considéré pour son compte: *le plan pré-philosophique qu’elle doit tracer* (immanence), *le ou les personnages pro-philosophiques qu’elle doit inventer et faire vivre* (insistance), *les concepts philosophiques qu’elle doit créer* (consistance). (*Qqp* 74; italics in the text)

In this passage, Deleuze appears to ascribe agency to “la philosophie,” in making it the referent for the pronoun “elle” in the italicized sequence. He also employs both the imperative and the impersonal infinitive to describe philosophy’s relations with the three elements: *qu’elle doit tracer, qu’elle doit inventer, qu’elle doit créer*. This combination is emphasized, including in its impersonality, in the next two sentences: “Tracer, inventer, créer, c’est la trinité philosophique. Traits diagrammatiques, personnalistes, et intensifs” (*Qqp* 74).

The point of citing this paragraph is that it provides in succinct terms a model – richly developed by Deleuze in *Qu’est-ce que la philosophie?* – for a relation between two terms across the incorporeal “plane of immanence” that is a philosopher’s œuvre, and in this case the œuvre of Deleuze. The terms are “concept” and “personnage conceptuel,” translated questionably by Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchell, as “conceptual persona.” This is confusing, given the close association in English of the word “persona” with the work of C.G. Jung, who gives it a very different meaning as “a kind of mask” (Jung 190). Such association may be the opposite of the sense given by Deleuze to the word “personnage” paired with “conceptuel.” Accordingly, where “personnage conceptuel” is given in English here, it will be as “conceptual characters.”

Deleuze’s subsequent provision of these terms in *Qu’est-ce que la philosophie?* enriches the significance of his having implicitly identified “becoming-child” as *concept*, for it opens the way toward considering instances of “becoming-child” that, as identified across the range of his œuvre can be said to provide a range of “personnages conceptuels.” But these are not masks. Instead, according to Deleuze of *Qu’est-ce que la philosophie?*
Le personnage conceptuel n’est pas le réprésentant du philosophe, c’est même l’inverse: le philosophe est seulement l’enveloppe de son principal personnage conceptuel et de tous les autres, qui sont les intercesseurs, les véritables sujets de sa philosophie. (*Qqp* 62; emphasis added).

On the basis of the foregoing chapters, it seems plausible to suggest, with the new vocabulary provided by *Qu’est-ce que la philosophie?*, that if a “principal conceptual character” can be associated with Deleuze, it is “enfant” / “child,” as it differentiates from virtual Idea to textual actuality across the surface of Deleuze’s *œuvre*. Earliest is its association in the Nietzsche books with Dionysos, Heraclitus, and Nietzsche’s Zarathustra, and with game, innocence, play, chance, and “the throw of the dice.” It then is abstracted in *Différence et répétition* as “a child,” providing an image by means of which Deleuze can develop the model of passive and active syntheses, of “larval egos,” and real and virtual “foyers” joined in a figure-8. Most rich, however, in Deleuze’s engagement with “enfant” / “child,” is its differentiation into the Alice of *Logique du sens*, such that surely, if “enfant” / “child,” as Idea, also makes for Deleuze’s “principal conceptual character” throughout his *œuvre*, Alice – “the little girl” – must be considered the principal child: the most prominent for Deleuze among the differentiations. “Enfant” / “child” – an incorporeal in the vocabulary of *Logique du sens* – then carries over to Deleuze’s work with Guattari, differentiating this time, most visibly to introduce both *L’Anti-Œdipe* and *Anti-Oedipus*, though in different ways, as this time a boy-child, given visual form in Lindner’s *Boy with Machine*, the book’s only image.

But it is only via this oblique and connect-the-dots interview reference to *Mille Plateaux* that the mapping given of “philosophy” in *Qu’est-ce que la philosophie?* clarifies itself in regard to “enfant” / “child” as deployed across the incorporeal *plan d’immanence* of Deleuze’s *œuvre*. For that Deleuze saw the term “plan d’immanence” in this way is made clear:

À la limite, n’est-ce pas chaque grand philosophe qui trace un nouveau plan d’immanence, apporte une nouvelle matière de l’être et dresse une nouvelle image de la pensée, au point qu’il n’y aurait pas deux grands philosophes sur le même plan? (*Qqp* 52).

It seems fair to suggest that Deleuze merits his own such “plan” as “grand philosophe.” But the plane must be peopled. How unique and/or highly original was Deleuze in *experiencing*, while a
young man, “concepts” as having “le même effet que pour d’autres, la rencontre de personnages de roman fantastique,” as he would tell Claire Parnet in 1988? (Abc, 52:47 D-F; transcript Charles Stivale). With maturation, Deleuze of 1991 distinguishes between “concepts” and “personnages conceptuels.” And on the plan d’immanence of Deleuze’s thought, it is “becoming-child” that is the concept: impersonal, transferable, yet of the order described by Deleuze when he says “Il me semble que les concepts ont une existence propre, ils sont animés, ce sont des créatures invisibles.”

*Mille Plateaux* also explores depersonalization precisely in “devenir-enfant” / “becoming-child.” Deleuze and Guattari describe “becoming” in broad terms this way:

> Le devenir est le mouvement par lequel la ligne se libère du point, et rend les points indiscernables: rhizome, l’opposé de l’arborescence, se dégager de l’arborescence. *Le devenir est une anti-mémoire.* (MP 360; italics in the text)

Noteworthy here is that the translator of *Mille Plateaux*, Brian Massumi, gives “la ligne se libère” in the active voice: “the line frees itself.” As previously noted, the translators of *Logique du sens* tend to give reflexive verbs in the passive impersonal, as in “the line is freed.” “Frees itself” is more in keeping with a “world swarming with anonymous and nomadic singularities that are impersonal and pre-individual,” such as Deleuze advocates for in *Logique du sens*. This applies, *mutatis mutandis*, to many more instances of reflexive verbs.

Deleuze and Guattari then distinguish “un bloc d’enfance, ou un devenir enfant” from “souvenir d’enfance,” toward production of what they call “un’ enfant moléculaire.” Here Massumi chooses the English “block” for the French “bloc,” rather than, simply, “bloc”: this produces potential for confusion, given the range of meaning for “block” that is absent in “bloc.”

Explaining this further, they continue:

> ...“un enfant” coexiste avec nous, dans une zone de voisinage ou un bloc de devenir, sur une ligne de déterritorialisation qui nous emporte tous deux, – contrairement à l’enfant que nous avons été, dont nous souvenons ou que nous fantasmons, l’enfant molaire dont l’adulte est l’avenir (MP 360).
What do they mean by “une zone de voisinage ou un bloc de devenir”? Do these exist as incorporeal (or virtual) “foyers” of the sort to which Deleuze of 1968 refers in *Différence et répétition*, in the context of Henri Maldiney’s figure-8 image? They assert: “un enfant coexiste avec nous.” This is paradoxical, but reminiscent also of Lindner’s *Boy with Machine* as introductory image to a book by both of them. But is this the “nous” they mean?

For clarification, Deleuze and Guattari go to an early twentieth century English author, and her 1928 novel *Orlando*:

> “Ce sera l’enfance, mais ce ne doit pas être mon enfance,” écrit Virginia Woolf. (*Orlando* déjà n’opérait par souvenirs, mais par blocs, blocs d’âges, blocs d’époques, blocs de règnes, blocs de sexes, formant autant de devenirs entre les choses, ou de lignes de déterritorialisation.) (*MP* 360)

They add in a footnote, citing the reference in Woolf as “Journal d’un écrivain, 10-18”:

> Il en est de même chez Kafka, où les blocs d’enfance fonctionnent à l’opposé de souvenirs d’enfance. Le cas de Proust est plus compliqué, parce qu’il opère un mélange des deux. La psychanalyse est dans la situation de saisir des souvenirs ou fantasmes, mais jamais les blocs d’enfance (*MP* 361).

That this terminology was itself in process of becoming for Deleuze and Guattari is suggested in an auto-correction of “le mot ‘souvenir’”: “Chaque fois que nous avons employé le mot ‘souvenir,’ dans les pages précédentes, c’était donc à tort, nous voulions dire ‘devenir,’ nous disions devenir” (*MP* 360). This would seem an exemplary instance of Deleuze’s emphasis on the value of “stammering” in the development of thought (*Cc* 73). But if one of the ironies of Deleuze and Guattari’s style of rhizomatic polemic is that it has maintained currency mostly in hierarchically structured universities, an analogy toward a better sense of the word “bloc” as applied to impersonal “enfance” might indeed be found, paradoxically, in the actions of anarchist Black Bloc collectives at anti-globalization events of the early 2000s in Seattle (December, 1999) and Quebec City (April, 2001). For renouncing standard constructions of “individuality,” these collectives were event-based, highly mobile, anonymous, and impersonal, forming and re-forming opportunistically and strategically with an element of chance and even play. Likewise a more recent example of “bloc d’enfance,” and one even more directly relevant to “becoming-
child,” must surely be the anonymous all-female Russian activist performance collective Pussy Riot, out of their actions especially at the Cathedral of the Epiphany in Yelokhovo on 19 February, 2012, and at the Cathedral of Christ the Saviour in Moscow on 21 February, 2012. As spliced into a single video uploaded to YouTube, these carried the concept of “becoming-child,” as well as the personnage conceptuel of “the little girl,” to new zones of intensity. Their pertinence is emphasized in a reply from prison by Nadezhda Tolokonnikova on 23 February, 2013, to Slavoj Žižek, who had written to her on 2 January. Having been identified and convicted with Maria Alyokhina of “hooliganism inciting religious hatred,” she wrote that:

Borrowing Nietzsche’s definition, we are the children of Dionysus, sailing in a barrel and not recogniseing any authority. We are a part of this force that has no final answers or absolute truths, for our mission is to question. (Tolokonnikova)

There is also, in Mille Plateaux, a kind of reverse “devenir-enfant” that bears mention. In the fourth plateau, “20 novembre 1923 – Postulats de la linguistique,” Deleuze and Guattari write of “des transformations incorporelles ayant cours dans une société donnée, et que s’attribuent aux corps de cette société” (MP 102; italics in the text). Harkening implicitly back to the “Stoic” distinction between bodies and incorporeals developed by Deleuze in Logique du sens, they note that:

Nous pouvons donner au mot “corps” le sens le plus général (il y a des corps moraux, les âmes sont des corps, etc.); nous devons cependant distinguer les actions et passions qui affectent ces corps, et les actes, qui n’en sont que des attributs non corporel, ou qui sont “l’exprimé” d’un énoncé. (MP 102)

As an example of an incorporeal transformation, they give “the magistrate’s sentence that transforms the accused into the condemned”; this transformation they describe as “a pure instantaneous act or incorporeal attribute.” Likewise:

La paix et la guerre sont des états ou des mélanges de corps très différents; mais le décret de mobilisation générale exprime une transformation incorporelle et instantanée des corps. (MP 102)
But there is one such incorporeal transformation that must exercise a chilling effect on the very concept “becoming-child”:

“Tu n’es plus un enfant...”: cet énoncé concerne une transformation incorporelle, même si elle se dit des corps et s’insère dans leurs actions et passions. La transformation incorporelle se reconnaît à son instantanéité, à son immédiateté, à la simultanéité de l’énoncé qui l’exprime et de l’effet qu’elle produit ... (MP 102)

The suggestion would seem to be that in relation, in particular, to “devenir-enfant,” there is also always “une société donnée” ready to effect an instant “incorporeal transformation” by what deserves to be called a put-down: “You are no longer a child...”

Yet this is surely a reproach with different implications if spoken explicitly by a parent to a child. Or by a child to a parent. Or by judge to a delinquent just turned eighteen.

In 1988, at age sixty three, Gilles Deleuze collaborated with his friend and former student Claire Parnet in eight hours of videos called *L’Abécédaire de Gilles Deleuze*, built around topics chosen by Parnet and the director Pierre-André Boutang based on the letters of the alphabet (Lefort). The videos were recorded by Boutang under a plan that *L’Abécédaire* would not be shown publicly until after Deleuze’s death. But this arrangement was foregone, and the videos, according to their English translator Charles Stivale, “were shown with his permission on the Arte channel between November 1994 and spring 1995” (Stivale 2011), just months before he defenestrated himself on 4 November, 1995.

Rejecting descriptions of “discussion,” “interview,” “conversation,” and “exchange,” Parnet chose retrospectively in 1997 the term “intercession” to describe her role with Deleuze:

> L’intercession, c’est la capture, une double capture en l’occurrence, qui n’a rien à voir avec une communion des esprits ou je ne sais quoi. L’effet escompté, et je crois obtenu, ce n’est pas que Gilles Deleuze en personne réponde aux questions de Claire Parnet, autre personne, mais qu’il y ait de l’interférence, et surtout une interférence entre l’œuvre et la vie de Gilles. (Lefort).

In this sense, Parnet herself – not a little girl or a girl, but a woman – became “the paradoxical instance” that set resonating the two series: *l’œuvre de Gilles Deleuze*, and *la vie de Gilles Deleuze*. Her accomplishment in “Enfance,” the subject chosen for the letter “E,” is stunning.

At thirty seven minutes, the “Enfance” section of *L’Abécédaire* is one of the longest (30:20 to 1:07:20 in D to F). A video-recording differs from a written text, and *L’Abécédaire* likewise occupies a small part of Deleuze’s *œuvre*; indeed according to Parnet in 1997, he did not consider it a part of this *œuvre*, which he identified with writing (Lefort). But Parnet – whose obvious affection for Deleuze clearly underwrites but does not get in the way of her probing – draws him into talking about his own childhood in Paris and Deauville before the Second World War, about his father and mother, and about his education. Deleuze is charming, warm, witty, complex: in short, richly human, as per the term in the vernacular; his voice, however, is already congested and wheezing, adding to the poignancy of this presence. But after some twenty four minutes of this specificity – of Deleuze recounting experience as it involved him – Parnet
interrupts just as he is musing, clearly in some sense moved, about Oradour: a small town in south central France whose entire population of over six hundred were slaughtered on 10 June, 1944 by German Nazi Waffen SS en route to Normandy. Remarkably, a map shows that Oradour-sur-Glane (the full name of the town) is just forty six kilometres by road from St-Léonard-de-Noblat, as the village where Deleuze and his family had their country house. It is also almost the same distance northeast of Limoges, as St-Léonard-de-Noblat is to the northwest: as the crow flies, the villages are within about thirty five kilometres of one another. This goes unmentioned by Parnet, or for that matter by François Dosse in his biography. But clearly, the name “Oradour” was a word of complex sense for Deleuze.

Parnet, however, interjects: “Alors, pour finir avec enfance...” She then says it seems that childhood has little importance for Deleuze, that it is not talked about, and does not provide reference (ABC D-F 55:04-56-20). Deleuze, in a distinctly different tone of voice, and after a moment, answers “Oui” to each of these assessments. Then he laughs awkwardly (and touchingly): he has been human, an individual. She has, in her style of “interference,” caught him musing on the personal past.

In the course of the abstract revision that follows, the ghostly image of the 1988 version of Gilles Deleuze reprises the case made in *Mille Plateaux* with Guattari:

> Il y a un devenir-animal du langage même et de l’écrivain. Et aussi il y a un devenir-enfant, mais ce n’est pas son enfance. Il devient un enfant, oui, mais ce n’est pas son enfance, ce n’est plus l’enfance de personne, c’est l’enfance du monde, c’est l’enfance d’un monde, alors, c’est ça qui m’intéresse de l’enfance (ABC D-F 56:20).

This introduces two new terms: “l’enfance du monde,” and “l’enfance d’un monde.” Deleuze has already written, with Guattari, that “l’enfant ne devient pas, c’est le devenir lui-même qui est enfant,” and that “l’enfant est le devenir jeune de chaque âge” (*MP* 340). Again, there is the implicit repudiation of inherited categories of “God, self, and world,” and of individuality. Out of this, Deleuze of “Enfance” in *L’Abécédaire* says of “the writer”:

> Bon, et les tâches de l’écrivain, ce n’est pas de fouiller dans les archives familières, ce n’est pas de s’intéresser à son enfance, personne de digne ne
s’intéresse à son enfance. C’est une autre tâche de devenir enfant par l’écriture, arriver à une enfance du monde, restaurer une enfance du monde, ça, c’est une tâche de la littérature. (Abc D-F 56:20)

The genius of the Parnet – Boutang – Deleuze collaboration is that it gives, in “Enfance,” both a Deleuze of personal memory who, improbably, volunteers hints on his and his family’s connection of proximity to the site of one of the Western Front’s most horrific massacres in the Second World War, and a Deleuze who denies the relevance of personal memory / personal childhood, to a “devenir-enfant” that he identifies with “l’enfance du monde” and “l’enfance d’un monde.” These terms will be filled in, somewhat and in the way of suggestion, with the 1993 essay “Ce que les enfants disent,” in Critique et clinique. But Parnet and Boutang indeed create, via video technology, a highly successful “interference between the œuvre and the life” of Gilles Deleuze. Or to revert to the idiom of Logique du sens: they produce across the surface of the screen an unresolved “paradoxical element” – the ghostly image of a speaking Deleuze – that activates these series – the œuvre and the life – and sets them resonating.

Dosse gives a remarkable anecdote that perhaps sheds light on corporeal Deleuze’s approach both to “devenir-enfant” and to evading, in practical terms, the put-down “Tu n’es plus un enfant...” He quotes “the philosopher Corinne Enaudeau,” the daughter of Deleuze’s colleague at Vincennes in the 1970s, Jean-François Lyotard:

She believes that her father was truly political, unlike Deleuze. “There was a real difference of opinion about that. I remember my father coming home angry at Deleuze for passing everything on and not doing anything. He used to imitate him: ‘Listen, you know Jean-François, I think I haven’t got anything to say about that decision.’ Deleuze played at being a child with [François] Châtelet and Lyotard as parents to keep an eye on institutional matters.” (Dosse 353)

Again: does the personal, whose relevance Deleuze was habitually concerned to efface, bear on understanding and assessing these terms – “enfant” and “devenir-enfant” as they appear in his œuvre?
8. “Little Hans” and “little Richard” in “Ce que les enfants disent” (1993)

The eight-page essay “Ce que les enfants disent” appears in the collection *Critique et clinique*, published by Deleuze with Éditions de Minuit in 1993, and in English translation by Daniel W. Smith and Michael Greco as *Essays Critical and Clinical* in 1997. It entails specificity in beginning with reference to psychoanalytic studies of “little Hans” by Sigmund Freud in 1909, and “little Richard” by Melanie Klein in 1939: two small boys. But Deleuze’s concern is less with the details of these studies, than with both boys’ relations to what he calls “activité cartographique” (*Cc* 82). These he asserts both Freud and Klein misunderstand, in that they recast both boys’ interest in maps in terms of the psychoanalytic priority given to sexual fantasy regarding the parents. Deleuze rejects this reading, insisting that “le père et la mère ne sont pas les coordonnées de tout ce que l’inconscient investit” (*Cc* 82). On the contrary:

> C’est le propre de la libido de hanter l’histoire et la géographie, d’organiser des formations de mondes et des constellations d’univers, de dériver les continents, de les peupler de races, de tribus et de nations. ... La libido n’a pas de métamorphoses, mais des trajectoires historico-mondiales. (*Cc* 82-83)

Deleuze’s focus on “the libido” in this essay hearkens back, in terms of ontology, to the “Freudian moment” in *Différence et répétition* when the vocabulary of univocity is supplemented by his identification of “the Id” (le Ça) with “a mobile distribution of differences and local resolutions within an intensive field,” and the “drives” with “bound excitations” (*DaR* 96-97). This impersonal model subsequently evolves in his work with Guattari to make for investments in “libido [as] the essence of desire,” “desire as autoproduction of the unconscious,” “desiring machines [as] the non-human sex,” and “desiring production [as] pure multiplicity” (*A-O* 143, 26, 294, 42). But in here advocating for “activité cartographique” in relation to the unconscious, out of Freud’s and Klein’s work with little Hans and little Richard respectively, Deleuze also presents another variant on the real/virtual, “deux foyers,” figure-8 model developed in relation to “a child” in *Différence et répétition*, and the bodies / incorporeals model developed in relation to Alice in *Logique du sens*. In this case, it has to do with relations between the imaginary and the real, with implicit reference to how these terms are used by Jacques Lacan. Deleuze challenges the pertinence of a “distinction” between the two. Rather:
l’imaginaire et le réel doivent être plutôt comme deux parties juxtaposables ou superposables d’une même trajectoire, deux faces qui ne cessent de s’échanger, miroir mobile. (*Cc* 83)

It is out of this depiction that the earlier models – both also evolved in relation to child-figures – are evoked:

À la limite, l’imaginaire est une image virtuelle qui s’accole à l’objet réel, et inversement, pour constituer un cristal d’inconscient. Il ne suffit pas que l’objet réel, le paysage réel évoque des images semblables ou voisines; il faut qu’il dégage sa propre image virtuelle, en même temps que celle-ci, comme paysage imaginaire, s’engage dans le réel suivant un circuit... (*Cc* 83)

Deleuze of 1993 even uses the same verb – “dégage” – as Deleuze of 1969 uses in *Logique du sens* to describe Alice’s relation of action to “her incorporeal double” in passing through the looking glass: “elle dégage son double incorporel” (*Lds* 20). But here it appears in regard to “the real object, the real landscape.” This again raises the question of agency when, as Deleuze and Guattari put it in *Anti-Oedipus*, “there is no ego at the centre” (*AO* 88). And again, there is the ambiguity of the French reflexive verb: in this case “l’imaginaire est une image virtuelle qui s’accole à l’objet réel, et inversement.” In Deleuze’s “world swarming with anonymous and nomadic singularities that are impersonal and pre-individual,” this could as easily be “places itself beside” as “is placed beside.” Or as Deleuze and Guattari put it in *Anti-Oedipus*: “everything is a machine” (*A-O* 2).

But in this case, between the first quoted passage directly above, ending “miroir mobile”, and the second, beginning “À la limite...” and containing the image of “un cristal d’inconscient,” Deleuze gives a different kind of example, much removed not only from Freud and Klein, but also, it would seem, from Little Hans and Little Richard, and their interest in maps:

Ainsi les aborigènes d’Australie joignent des itinéraires nomades et des voyages en rêve qui composent ensemble “un entrelaillage de parcours,” “dans une immense découpe de l’espace et du temps qu’il faut lire comme une carte.” (*Cc* 83)
The quotations inside the quotation refer to Barbara Glowczewski, *Du rêve à la loi chez les Aborigènes*. And the question arises: is this a paradoxical development, by circuitous means and out of the specificity to two twentieth century studies involving two twentieth century actual children – Little Hans and Little Richard – of Deleuze’s invocation of “enfance du monde” and “enfance d’un monde” in *L’Abécédaire*? To recall that passage, offered by Deleuze in regard to the act of writing and the writer:

> Et aussi il y a un devenir-enfant, mais ce n’est pas son enfance. Il devient un enfant, oui, mais ce n’est pas son enfance, ce n’est plus l’enfance de personne, c’est l’enfance du monde, c’est l’enfance d’un monde, alors, c’est ça qui m’intéresse de l’enfance (Abc D-F 56:20).

Deleuze in this essay make a big leap, via – as he describes it – the impersonality of libido with its “traitoires historico-mondiales” (Cc 83), from the specificities of Little Hans and Little Richard and their interest in making maps of the world as they experienced it, to that kind of “enfance du monde” that can be associated with non-literate societies, and that – according to the quotation -- blends space and time, trajectory and intensity into an “entremaillage de parcours.”

The figure-8 of *Différence et répétition*, presented and developed in relation to “un enfant,” and the distinction bodies-incorporeals, with between them a surface of activation, presented and developed in relation to Alice, are joined here by a new image, the “crystal of the unconscious,” presented and developed in relation to “les aborigènes d’Australie,” with their “nomadic itineraries and dream voyages that together make for ‘an intermingling of routes,’ ‘in an immense cut of space and time that it is necessary to read like a map.”

Similarly, after distinguishing “une conception cartographique” from “la conception archéoloqique de la psychanalyse,” such as he claims “ties the unconscious profoundly to memory,” Deleuze gives another example on a scale outside modernity:

> La tombe du pharaon, avec sa chambre centrale inerte au plus bas de la pyramide, fait place à des modèles plus dynamiques: de la dérive des continents à la migration des peuples, tout ce par quoi l’inconscient cartographie l’univers. Le modèle indien remplace l’égyptien ... (Cc 84)
It is not immediately clear to which “modèle indien” Deleuze is referring: Subcontinental or American. The elaboration given by Deleuze of this term does not make for clarity:

...le passage des Indiens dans l’épaisseur des rochers mêmes, où la forme esthétique ne se confond plus avec la commémoration d’un départ ou d’une arrivée, mais avec la création de chemins sans mémoire, toute la mémoire du monde restant dans le matériau. (Cc 84)

This again hints at the derogation of individual memory by Deleuze in *L’Abécédaire*’s “Enfance.” In a footnote, however, he reveals its derivation from page 38 of *L’Art médiéval*, the second volume of *Histoire de l’art* (1921) by Jacques Élie Faure (1873-1937). As given in the footnote, Faure’s passage reads:

“Our, au bord de la mer, au seuil d’une montagne, ils rencontraient une muraille de granit. Alors ils entraient tous dans le granit ... Derrière eux ils laissaient le roc évidé, des galeries creusées dans tous les sens, des parois sculptées, ciselées, des piliers naturels ou factices...” (Cc 84; ellipses in Deleuze’s quotation)

But this allusion to the primordiality of rock still does not make clear which “Indians” are meant, leaving as the only option for clarity to go back to Faure. The first chapter of *L’Art médiéval* concerns “Les Indes,” and the passage quoted by Deleuze is in a paragraph that begins:

Pour les Indiens, toute la nature est divine, et, au-dessous du grand Indra, tous les dieux sont de puissance égale et peuvent menacer ou détrôner les autres dieux, dieux concrets, dieux abstraits, le soleil, la jungle, le tigre, l’éléphant, les forces qui créent et celles qui détruisent, la guerre, l’amour, la mort (Faure 37).

The reference to Indra shows that it is Subcontinental “Indians” to whom Deleuze refers for a “more dynamic model” than that left by the pharaohs. And obviously these are not modern Indians, but ancient ones, providing another hint of reference to the new deployment by Deleuze in *L’Abécédaire*: “l’enfance du monde,” “l’enfance d’un monde.” Deleuze singles out their encounter with “a wall of granite” into whose thickness they pass,” in the “creation of paths without memory, all the memory of the world resting in the material.” But the “more dynamic model” seems also to include – insofar as context matters in the reference to Faure – Hinduism’s
multitude of “gods of equal power ... concrete gods, abstract gods,” whose profuse multiplicity resonates, at least loosely, with Deleuze’s 1969 advocacy, in Logique du sens, of “un monde fourmillant des singularités anonymes et nomades, impersonnelles, préindividuelles” (Lds 125).

But “l’activité cartographique,” regarding which Deleuze extrapolates from the cases of little Hans, little Richard, and, briefly, “little Arpad” as psychoanalyzed by Sandor Ferenczi,

ne doivent pas seulement se comprendre en extension, par rapport à un espace constitué de trajets. Il y a aussi des cartes d’intensité, de densité qui concernent ce qui remplit l’espace, ce qui sous-tend le trajet. (Cc 84)

Such a “map of intensity,” writes Deleuze of 1993, involves a “distribution of affects,” and is at once an “affective constellation,” a “map of forces” and itself “a becoming” (Cc 84-85). Little Hans “est entraîné dans un devenir-cheval,” and little Arpad in “un devenir-coq” (Cc 85); in each case, Deleuze tells us, “psychoanalysis misreads the relationship between the unconscious and forces,” focusing on child-parent relations and their specificities. Rather:

l’image n’est pas seulement trajet, mais devenir. Le devenir est ce qui sous-tend le trajet, comme les forces intensives sous-tendent les forces motrices... Les deux cartes, des trajets et des affects, renvoient l’une à l’autre. (Cc 85)

This relation of maps to libido is cast by Deleuze in the indefinite article, in a way that makes explicit both the tension of the reflexive verb throughout his work, and the difference that resides in this being cast in the passive impersonal in English, as often occurs in translation:

Ce qui concerne la libido, ce que la libido investit se présente avec un article indéfini, ou plutôt est présenté par l’article indéfini: un animal comme qualification d’un devenir ou spécification d’un trajet (un cheval, une poule...); un corps ou un organe comme pouvoir d’affecter et d’être affecté (un ventre, des yeux...). (Cc 86; italics and ellipses in the text)

In these cases, language intervenes and it is language that is active: that which presents itself as invested by the libido is presented by language via the indefinite article.

“L’indéfini,” then, for Deleuze, is “la détermination du devenir, sa puissance propre, la puissance d’un impersonnel qui n’est pas une généralité, mais une singularité au plus haut point” (Cc 86).
Deleuze then makes another leap, in this audacious essay that begins so modestly: with the interest of two little boys in making maps. This “puissance” carries over to art:

L’art aussi atteint à cet état céleste qui ne garde plus rien de personnel ni de rationnel. À sa manière, l’art dit ce que disent les enfants. Il est fait de trajets et de devenirs, aussi fait-il des cartes, extensives et intensives. (Cc 86)

The example that Deleuze then gives, however, again hearkens back, to a notion of “art” profoundly distant from modernism’s focus on proper names. And in this case, too, the primordiality of the material referred to – again stone – invokes a sense of “enfance du monde”:

L’art se définit alors comme un processus impersonnel où l’œuvre se compose un peu comme un cairn, avec les pierres apportées par différents voyageurs et devenants (plutôt que revenants) qui dépendent ou non d’un même auteur. (Cc 87; italics in the text)

Deleuze of 1993, then, opposes to an “art-archéologie qui s’enfonce dans les millénaires pour atteindre à l’immémorial,” an “art-cartographie qui repose sur ‘les choses d’oubli et les lieux de passage’” (Cc 87): intensities and spaces. And in concluding, he invokes a name that was as much as forgotten during the period of his work with Guattari and even after: an old familiar, that at once hearkens back to a much earlier phase of his own œuvre, to the first differentiations of an Idea called “enfant” / “child” into “personnage conceptuel” (before such a term existed), and also, surely, to an “enfance du monde,” “le dieu de l’affirmation” (Cc 130):

Trajets et devenirs, l’art les rend présents les uns dans les autres; il rend sensible leur présence mutuelle, et se définit ainsi, invoquant Dionysos comme le dieu des lieux de passage et des choses d’oubli. (Cc 88; italics in text)

“L’Immanence: une vie” was the last text published by Deleuze-corporeal: an essay of about fifteen hundred words that appeared in the journal Philosophie in September, 1995, two months before he broached the plane of the window frame. It was republished in French as the last entry in Deux régimes de fous: textes et entretiens 1975-1995, and bibliographic research indicates that it has been translated at least three times: more often than any other complete text under the name “Deleuze.” It begins with the question “Qu’est-ce qu’un champ transcendantal?” (Drf 359) and both this question itself and the paragraph that follows, giving a reply, reprise a paragraph in the fifteenth series of Logique du sens, “of singularities,” that begins:

Nous cherchons à déterminer un champ transcendantal impersonnel et préindividuel, qui ne ressemble pas aux champs empiriques correspondants et qui ne se confond pas pourtant avec une profondeur indifférenciée. (Lds 124)

The second sentence in “L’Immanence: une vie,” in reply to the question “Qu’est-ce qu’un champ transcendantal?” likewise maps onto the second part of this earlier passage in stating what such a “field” is not: “Il se distingue de l’expérience, en tant qu’il ne renvoie pas à un objet ni n’appartient à un sujet (représentation empirique)” (Drf 359).

Deleuze of 1995 then suggests of “un champ transcendantal”: “Aussi se présente-t-il comme pur courant de conscience a-subjectif, conscience pré-reflexive impersonnelle, durée qualitative de la conscience sans moi” (Drf 359). This appears to diverge from Logique du sens:

Ce champ ne peut pas être déterminé comme celui d’une conscience: malgré la tentative de Sartre, on ne peut pas garder la conscience comme milieu tout en récusant la forme de la personne et le point de vue de l’individuation. Une conscience n’est rien sans synthèse d’unification, mais il n y a pas de synthèse d’unification de conscience sans forme du Je ni point de vue du Moi. (Lds 124)

And indeed, Deleuze of 1995 also soon issues similar qualification:

Mais le rapport du champ transcendantal, avec la conscience est seulement le droit. La conscience ne devient un fait que si un sujet est produit en même temps
que son objet, tous hors champ et apparaissant comme des “transcendants.” (Drf 359)

“The fifteenth series of singularities” in Logique du sens is surely one of the book’s most important, in that it is where Deleuze of 1969 gives the “caractères principaux” of a peculiar “world”: “Quand s’ouvre le monde fourmillant des singularités anonymes et nomades, impersonnelle, pré-individuelles, nous foulons enfin le champ transcendantal” (Lds 125). The verb “fouler” can, in English, mean “tread” or “trample,” depending on context. Here, it would seem to mean “tread,” such that with the “cinq caractères principaux,” Deleuze of 1969 seems to offer terms of access to “le champ transcendantal.” These characteristics, four of which are described on pages 43 and 44 above, present a model: “les singularités-événements correspondent à des séries hétérogènes qui s’organisent en un système ni stable ni instable, mais ‘métastable’” (Lds 125); these are set resonating, on a surface, by “un élément paradoxalement” that cuts across them. Yet after this depiction, Deleuze of 1969 still leaves the matter open: “Mais la question de savoir comment le champ transcendantal doit être déterminé est très complexe” (Lds 128).

This is the question to which a crippled Deleuze returned in his last published work, and the similarities in the paragraphs that engage the question of “the transcendental field” are such as to suggest his late re-engagement precisely with these pages in Logique du sens as also, it might be called, the book of Alice. Or rather: the book of Alice and the three-faced concoction worthy of any character deployed by Carroll for encounter with Alice behind the looking glass:

un tiers stoïcien, un tiers Zen, un tiers Carroll: d’une main se masturbant en un geste de trop, de l’autre écrivant sur le sable les paroles magiques de l’événement pur ouvertes à l’univoque… (Lds 289-290)

Deleuze of 1995, however, takes up the question of “a transcendental field” from a different angle, that of immanence:

À défaut de conscience, le champ transcendantal se définirait comme un pur plan d’immanence, puisqu’il échappe à toute transcendance au sujet comme de l’objet. L’immanence absolue est en elle-même … c’est quand l’immanence n’est
plus l’immanence à autre chose que soi qu’on peut parler d’un plan d’immanence.

(Drf 360)

The term “plan d’immanence” has been developed in Qu’est-ce que la philosophie? of 1991 in relation to “personnages conceptuels” and “concepts”; in this case, however, Deleuze of 1995 equates “le champ transcendantal” with “un pur plan d’immanence,” which itself is linked with “l’immanence absolue.” The next step is to identify “pure immanence” with:

UNE VIE, et rien d’autre. Elle n’est pas immanence à la vie, mais l’immanence que n’est en rien est elle-même une vie. Une vie est l’immanence de l’immanence, l’immanence absolue: elle est puissance, bénédiction complètes. (Drf 360)

“L’Immanence: une vie” concerns, again, the power of the indefinite article, such as Deleuze has linked already with the force of “la libido” and “l’inconscient,” both with definite articles, in “Ce que les enfants disent”: “un animal comme qualification d’un devenir ou spécification d’un trajet ... ; un corps ou un organe comme pouvoir d’affecter et d’être affecté ...” (Cc 86). But here, designated “comme indice du transcendantal,” it is carried to “une vie,” “a life,” in relation to “l’immanence absolue,” as again the dynamic substratum given with a definite article.

Accordingly, for Deleuze of 1995, “Le champ transcendantal se définit par un plan d’immanence, et le plan d’immanence par une vie” (Drf 361). And “une vie est partout, dans tous les moments que traverse tel ou tel sujet vivant et que mesurent tels objets vécus: vie immanente emportant les événements ou singularités qui ne font que s’actualiser dans les sujets et les objets” (Drf 362; italics in the text). What this “carrying along” implies is that:

Les singularités ou les événements constitutifs d’une vie coexistent avec les accidents de la vie correspondante, mais ne se groupent ni ne se divisent de la même façon. Ils communiquent entre eux de tout autre façon que les individus. Il apparaît même qu’une vie singulière peut se passer de toute individualité, ou de tout autre concomitant qui l’individualise. (Drf 362; italics in the text)

Again, this is the language of prepersonal singularities and events of Logique du sens, summarized in the “fifteenth series,” that “organize themselves into a system neither stable nor unstable, but ‘metastable’” (Lds 125), and whose terms do not respect conventions of the person
or subject. And it is in an example of “a singular life” without “individuality” that the last differenciation of “enfant”/“child” in Deleuze’s œuvre appears:

Par exemple les tout-petits enfants se ressemblent tous et n’ont guère d’individualité; mais ils ont des singularités, un sourire, un geste, une grimace, événements qui ne sont pas des caractères subjectifs. Les tout-petits enfants sont traversés d’une vie immanente qui est pure puissance, et même béatitude à travers les souffrances et les faiblesses. (Drf 362)

The Collins-Roberts French Dictionary gives “tout-petit” as a noun meaning “toddler or tiny tot,” with “les tout-petits” as plural. For Deleuze to have written “les tout-petits enfants,” then, implies a double noun: “toddler children” or “tiny-tot children.” A toddler is a child learning to walk and not steady on his or her feet: a child, that is, between about one and two years.

There is, however, almost comical divergence in this term’s translation. Nick Millett, in 1997 for the journal Theory, Culture and Society, gives “very young children.” (Millett 6). Daniel W. Smith, in the 1997 essay “‘A Life of Pure Immanence’: Deleuze’s ‘Critique et Clinique’ Project,” gives “small infants” for the first instance of “les tout-petits enfants,” and “infants” for the second (Smith 2012 191). Anne Boyman, in Pure Immanence: Essays on a Life (2001) gives the most confusing version: “very small children” for the first instance, and “small children” for the second (PI 30). Ames Hodges and Mike Taormina, in the reprint of the essay that ends Two Regimes of Madness (2007) give “infants” in both cases (TRM 391). Nor is this ambiguity confined to translation, in that Stéfan Leclercq, in a 2002 essay called “Deleuze et les bêbés,” simply replaces “tout-petits enfants” with the less equivocal “bêbés” in a paraphrase:

La vie, dans son rapport le plus singulier avec une pensée impersonnelle, s’incarne dans la figure du bébé. ... Tous les bébés se ressemblent mais montrent des expressions qui toutes entières les traversent, comme un sourire ou une mimique. Ces expressions sont les manifestations d’une vie qui parcourt et qui singularise, sans individualiser, le bébé. (Leclercq 265)

The Boyman translation makes Deleuze sound ridiculous by stating first that “very small children all resemble one another and have hardly any individuality,” and then by conflating these with “small children.” Could Deleuze the philosopher, like Thales who according to Plato
in *Theaetetus*, “was looking up to study the stars and tumbled down a well” (*Theaetetus* 174b), have been so oblivious to the distinctiveness of “small children”? It is from this ambiguity of “tout-petits enfants” that Leclercq’s substitution of “bébés” rescues Deleuze, as does the translation “infants” by Smith and Hodges/Taormina. For it seems less contentious to say that “babies” or “infants” “all resemble one another and have hardly any individuality.” The problem, however, is that Deleuze did not write “bébés.” He wrote “tout-petits enfants,” as a term that, if the literal translation “toddler-children” is admitted, provides a reminder that the period of “toddling” – about one to two years of age – overlaps with the age frame of six to eighteen months that Jacques Lacan identifies with “the mirror stage” as “the symbolic matrix in which the I is precipitated in primordial form”; a threshold of awareness that Lacan links with the term “trotte-bébé” (Lacan 1-2). Was Deleuze, with the unusual and likewise hyphenated double noun – “tout-petits enfants” – hinting at this cross-reference, even at risk of ambiguity? His engagement with Lacan was long, going back to *Différence et répétition* and *Logique du sens*.

Might this, then, be another instance of Deleuze’s cross-referencing back, in this last, dense text clearly produced when he was very ill, to one of the first phases of *œuvre*, “un plan d’immanence” in the sense the term in *Qu’est-ce que la philosophie?* For it is in *Différence et répétition* as – according to Deleuze of 1986 – “le premier livre où j’essayais de ‘faire la philosophie’” (*Drf* 280), that Deleuze of 1968 introduces “a child” / “un enfant” precisely in terms of “un enfant qui commence à marcher [et qui] ne se contente pas de lier des excitations dans une synthèse passive ...” (*Der* 131-132, emphasis added). This age-based scenario then provides the basis for both differentiation of the real and the virtual for “a child,” and reference to Maldiney’s model of the figure-8, at whose crossing Deleuze of 1968 places ego formation. Deleuze’s hostility to the “point de vue du Moi” (*Lds* 124) in his record of texts, including those with Guattari, is profound: the ego is the enemy of “a life.” “Les tout-petits enfants,” if the literal translation “toddler children” is given, are also children just learning to walk, poised on the edge of division: “les deux foyers” and the crossing of the figure-8 that will – according to this model – produce the ego. Is it of children at or before this threshold that Deleuze could write: “Les tout-petits enfants sont traversés d’une vie immanente qui est pure puissance, et même béatitude à travers les souffrances et les faiblesses”? But there remains another paradox in this *œuvre* of paradoxes, where terms of nominal simplicity – “enfant” / “child” – come with a
“world” so foreign to conventions of ontology since Plato, they become, in their strangeness, through a path of convolutions. In this case, the paradox is that equation of “une vie immanente” with “pure puissance, et même béatitude” via “tout-petits enfants,” belongs to a line through Deleuze’s œuvre that includes a name: “Dionysos, “puissance de l’affirmation” (N 35).
Conclusion: *L’oiseau philosophie* / “...der den Leben ein Stachel”

The photograph at right provides a distinctive surface of sense for Deleuze and “enfant” / “child.” It shows Gilles Deleuze, corporeal Gilles Deleuze, with his daughter Émilie, born 7 May, 1964, and – as the object most in the foreground – a cigarette. As found on the internet on 17 March, 2013, via a search for “Deleuze – child,” this photograph was dated 1972. If the date is accurate, corporeal Émilie was just completing being seven and a half (Alice’s age in *Through the Looking Glass*), or just beginning being eight. Deleuze, born 18 January, 1925, was forty seven.

1972 was also the year that Deleuze and Félix Guattari published *L’Anti-Œdipe: Capitalisme et schizophrénie*, whose French print run sold out in three days (Dosse 207). This made them unlikely, even notorious celebrities, being often and persistently linked – as Alain Beaulieu comments – to “une doctrine du désir anarchique et de la perversion” (Beaulieu 2005).

In the photograph, Émilie seems to be erupting from Deleuze’s side like a new shoot on a vertical rhizome. Of the cigarette, nothing specific can be said with certainty, except that it is, as image, in the photograph’s foreground. A near certainty, however, surely, is that on either side of the photograph’s instant, Gilles Deleuze, as corporeal, was drawing in its smoke. For there seems little likelihood that he was holding it between his fingers just for show.

The photograph is registration of a moment, Aiôn, into a kind of Chronos: the always present. Sense nevertheless plays across the paradox of its surface. What is this sense?

1972 was also three years after Deleuze’s loss of a lung to tuberculosis (Dosse 178), and the question presses, before this image, as to whether his suicide was less “rational,” as Beaulieu has suggested, than incremental, enacted over time with each drawn breath of tobacco smoke, by an asthmatic man with one lung (Dosse 98). Did no one ever suggest to Deleuze that if he
continued this practice, he faced, corporeally speaking, a grim decline?

Within the context of this decline, a Deleuze who prepared “L’Immanence: une vie” as a testamentary text surely also had enough presence of mind to consider proximate death, and options in regard to it. Likewise, the circumstances existed for him to craft, both in relation to, and out of relation to, a disintegrating body, a death as itself an event and “paradoxical instance,” for maximum resonance of series, including – perhaps especially including – within his oeuvre, and across his own “plan d’immanence.” There is also indication that Deleuze in the period before his suicide re-engaged with precisely the part of Logique du sens that contains this model of sense production. For the opening question of the testamentary text – “Qu’est-ce qu’un champ transcendantal?” (Drf 459) – appears to pick up directly from a part of the “quinzième série des singularités” that ends with the statement: “Mais la question de savoir comment le champ transcendantal doit être déterminé est très complexe” (Lds 128). This is also the series where Deleuze of 1969 crafts, with concentrated brilliance, a model of sense production across a surface by divergent series set resonating by a paradoxical element. And the implication would certainly seem to be that it was to this series, and so to Logique du sens, as also the book of Alice, that Deleuze returned in the period before his death when he produced “L’Immanence: une vie.”

At some point in the early 1990s yet to be established, in the midst of corporeal Deleuze’s physical decline, when those who knew him as “Gilles” were watching the withering away of a diseased body, he was approached by an old friend, Jacqueline Duhême, with the suggestion that she illustrate a children’s book containing excerpts from his texts. Born in 1927 and so two years younger than Deleuze, Duhême had been his friend for four decades (Diatkine): a photograph likewise on the internet, dated 1955, shows the two at a Paris carnival shooting gallery two years before Deleuze’s marriage. Considering this

Figure Three
photograph, it is easy to see why one of Deleuze’s first books investigated the œuvre of Marcel Proust. Like Claire Parnet in L’Abécédaire de Gilles Deleuze, the photograph provides “interférence entre l’œuvre et la vie de Gilles...” But if its figures are – in keeping with Deleuze of 1993’s preference in “Ce que les enfants disent” – described via indefinite articles only, it suggests a young man, a bit of a dandy, taking in the seriousness of aim of a young woman, who appears to be his companion.

When an older Duhême approached Deleuze in the early 1990s, she was a respected illustrator of children’s books. At the time of the photograph, however, she was, like Deleuze, starting out. He had recently published his first book, Empiricisme et subjectivité (1953) on David Hume; he would not publish another until Nietzsche et la philosophie (1962). She had recently completed a years-long apprenticeship as assistant to, and model for, an octogenarian Henri Matisse, prior to his death in 1954; her own first venture into children’s books had been via a story written for her to illustrate by the poet Paul Éluard in 1948. These details about Duhême come via a paper called “Painting the imperceptible: when Duhême drew Deleuze” by Jane Newland, who interviewed her in Paris in 2012. The paper was presented at the Deterritorializing Deleuze conference in New Orleans from 25 to 27 June, 2012, but has not been published; a copy was provided by Professor Newland herself.

The joint achievement L’oiseau philosophie, published in 1997 within two years of Deleuze’s suicide, adds a new differenciation of “enfant”/“child” not so much within as at the margin of his œuvre. It makes for “a Deleuze” accessible through bite-sized texts – Deleuze of the aphorism – and through Duhême’s visual dialogue with these texts. In terms bequeathed by Logique du sens, the texts form a series, the visuals form a series, the two intersect sequentially across the surface of each page, and each of eighteen two-page spreads in turn resonates as per the description: “les signes restent dépourvus de sens tant qu’ils n’entrent pas dans l’organisation de surface qui assure la resonance entre deux séries (deux images-signes, deux photos ou deux pistes, etc.)” (Lds 126). But what is the “élément paradoxal [qui] parcourt et fait résonner les séries”?

In a broad sense, this might be suggested to be precisely the unqualified Idea – or incorporeal – “enfant” (or “child”) as itself paradoxically at once a virtual “line” through Deleuze’s œuvre and across the plane of immanence of his thought, and a spark that, when differenciated through
qualification within a text (including via being embedded in “the story of the three metamorphoses”) sets series resonating. Thus “Zeus-enfant,” “Dionysos-enfant,” and “l’enfant qui joue” of Heraclitus all make, in Nietzsche et la philosophie (1962) for resonance between the plural series “early Greek cosmology” / “pre-Socratic philosophy,” and the series “a reading of Nietzsche by Gilles Deleuze.” These terms are activators: a role made explicit three years later in Nietzsche (1965) when “enfant” is introduced as unqualified but embedded: “enfin le lion devient enfant” and “Enfin il appartient au lion de devenir enfant, c’est-à-dire Jeu et nouveau commencement, créateur de nouvelles valeurs et de nouveaux principes d’évaluation” (N 5). “Enfant” then emerges supercharged, via Deleuze’s last words in his forty four-page essay: “le Lion devient Enfant” (N 50).

Unqualified “enfant” / “child” becomes this active Idea / incorporeal-of-becoming in Deleuze’s œuvre: “Jeu et nouveau commencement, créateur de nouvelles valeurs et de nouveaux principes d’évaluation,” binding and re-binding with designations. The next of these is “un enfant” in Différence et répétition, as exemplary vehicle for Deleuze’s bottom-up, bicameral model for “the real” and “the virtual,” and for ego formation at the crossing of the figure-8 between the two (Der 132-133). After this: Alice in Logique du sens comes with a wealth of manifestations of “game” via terms given not only by the chessboard of Through the Looking Glass, but also by Deleuze’s introduction of another character in this “essai de roman logique et psychanalytique” (Lds 7): “un tiers stoïcien, un tiers Zen, un tiers Carroll: d’une main se masturbant en un geste de trop, de l’autre écrivant sur le sable les paroles magiques de l’événement pur ouvertes à l’univoque” (Lds 289-290). But there is also the introduction of something darker: what Artaud, as opposed to Carroll, does to “the child” (Lds 113).

Shortly thereafter an intersection takes place: a slicing through, a bending over onto one another of “planes of immanence” that introduces itself in L’AntiŒdipe of 1972 precisely via a new differenciation of “enfant” / “child”: Boy with Machine, “un énorme et turgide enfant, ayant greffé, faisant fonctionner une de ses petites machines désirantes sur une grosse machine sociale technique (car, nous le verrons c’est déjà vrai de l’enfant)” (AŒ 13). This introduces also a new game, called Deleuze-Guattari, and a new style of differenciation for “enfant” / “child.” It is here, however, that L’oiseau philosophie signals, subtly, paradoxically, but effectively, a rupture, as a book for children begun before Deleuze’s death, and completed after his suicide by the woman with the sharpness of eye and seriousness of aim suggested in the photograph of
1955. Newland in her article foregrounds a paradox. The thirty two texts distributed over the eighteen colour spreads of two pages each come from either the Deleuze-Parnet exchange published as Dialogues in 1977, or Qu’est-ce que la philosophie? (1991). Newland does not mention Dosse’s claim that the latter was “manifestly written by Deleuze alone,” but was credited to Deleuze and Guattari “as a tribute”: that it is therefore Deleuze’s voice in the structure of its every sentence, no longer actively intercut with Guattari’s. What Newland does point out, however, is that while Deleuze’s longstanding friendship with Jean-Pierre Bamburger, whom he met when teaching high school in Lyon, is referenced in several of Duhême’s drawings, “interestingly, Félix Guattari with whom Deleuze wrote some of his key works, does not feature in L’oiseau philosophie” (Newland 2012 5).

This exclusion implicitly highlights, again, the paradox of Qu’est-ce que la philosophie? and its attribution. Guattari’s name appears on the cover of the book that provides thirteen of the excerpts in L’Oiseau philosophie. Yet Duhême did not consider him visually relevant to the series fields she was constructing, in relation to texts associated only with Deleuze via the book’s subtitle: Duhème dessine Deleuze. What is thereby also signaled is that, whether deliberately or by intuition, Duhême decided that, in a book for children, there would be no visual presence for Guattari, who had died in 1992 and whose first collaboration with Deleuze was introduced via Boy with Machine. This does hint at the question: how did corporeal Deleuze’s old friends – among whom Duhême was clearly one – view his association with Guattari?

With L’oiseau philosophie, “enfant” / “child” as incorporeal “place without occupant and occupant without place, the empty square” that is also a virtual line through Deleuze’s œuvre, is re-cast in a different way, in relation to a child, any child who might come to it, say, via a teacher. In a 1997 article in Libération, “Dessine-moi un Deleuze,” Anne Diaktine records the responses of a class of children presented by their teacher, Guylaine Breyssens, with some of these bite-sized excerpts (Diaktine). Crucial to note is that each child’s response sets Deleuze-Duhême resonating in different ways. But with the spin of paradox so frequent in encounters with Deleuze, one of these children, it appears coincidentally, is named as “Lola,” and this specificity, in its resonance, provides a reminder that L’oiseau philosophie contains a dedication to Deleuze’s grand-daughter, Lola.
Diaktine in her article states that “Deleuze tenait énormément à ce petit livre,” even though, according to Newland, he never saw the finished product (Newland 2014b). Diaktine also provides, from Martine Laffon’s preface, an excerpt from a letter by Deleuze to Duhême about the book. In doing so she records a detail about the letter’s date that is not in the preface:

Deux mois avant sa mort, il écrivait à la dessinatrice: “Le choix des textes que vous avez fait, Martine Laffon et vous, me parait très beau: des textes très courts et d’apparence difficile auquel le dessin est capable de conférer une clarté rigoureuse en même temps qu’une tendresse. Il ne doit pas y avoir de suite logique, mais une cohérence esthétique.” (Diaktine)

According to Newland, Laffon as holder of a doctorate in philosophy and an editor at Seuil, chose the texts (Newland 2014b). Laffon, for her part, does not specify when Deleuze made the comments she quotes in the preface. But if these are ambiguities, Laffon does give these two short paragraphs:

Le livre pourrait s’adresser à sa petite-fille Lola qui n’hésite jamais à lui poser les questions.

“Dégager des concepts philosophiques des événements purs, c’est-à-dire capable d’affecter une petite fille, sans suite de logique,” c’est cette solution qui lui paraît si bonne et si conforme au génie de Jacqueline. (Deleuze – Duhême 2)

Deleuze, then, a mere two months before his suicide, appears to have been focused on a projected book that would be dedicated to “sa petite-fille Lola,” with the hyphen in French changing the meaning from “little girl” to “grand-daughter.” But though her age is not given, the second paragraph indicates that Lola was “une petite fille” in the wider sense also.

With this new set of details concerning Deleuze’s observed and stated interest in the months before his death, the questions earlier raised in the chapter on Logique du sens can again be posed, but in a more informed way. That is: how likely can it be that, in arriving at terms for his death as – respecting the import assigned the indefinite article in “Ce que les enfants disent” (1993) and “L’Immanence: une vie” (1995) – a death, with its own “cohérence esthétique,” Deleuze in his mental process was unaware of 4 November’s resonance with “enfant” Alice, as
“la petite fille” of *Through the Looking Glass* and *Logique du sens*? And secondly: how much more likely is it that his suicide as enacted became precisely a culminating “œuvre d’art à faire,” as this term was introduced in 1969 at the end of *Logique du sens*, in relation to the question “qu’est-ce qu’une petite fille?” (*Lds* 290).

But if Deleuze, from “up in the window,” repeated Alice when he went through its incorporeal plane on the repeating date of her passage through the looking glass, and so implicitly signaled her status as “principal personnage conceptuel” on his own “plan d’immanence,” he was surely also in his bodily trajectory implicitly invoking, through laceration, the repeating trajectory of Dionysos. For this, as “affirmation du devenir et du multiple” includes “la lacération et les membres dispersés de Dionysos (*N* 35),” even as it also, as repeating trajectory, begins with “Dionysos-enfant,” and in internal repetition includes “Dionysos-enfant”: “l’enfant joue, se retire du jeu, et y revient” (*Nep* 37). Somewhat remarkably, the last of Duhême’s coloured drawings in *L’oiseau philosophie*, without directly referencing either “la petite fille” or “Dionysos-enfant,” is nevertheless evocative of both. This drawing is not easily available for reproduction on account of copyright complexities. But it is at once striking and richly evocative, and as such deserves description.

Spread over two page-widths to conclude the book, it has a variegated dark blue background with wispy lightenings, especially on the right panel, which is otherwise devoid of image. The left panel, by contrast, is densely imagistic on this background, in five parts. The simplest of these parts to describe is itself multiple, in the form of twenty seven white forms on the blue background, suggestive of falling droplets. From the left panel’s base, there seems to erupt a second imagistic component: a conic shape whose sense of upward thrust is effected via vertically converging orange and yellow lines. Traversing this about a tenth of the way up the panel is the naked body, rigidly supine and tinted lightly purple, of a man with yellow-orange hair, whose face is shown in profile; whose visible right eye appears to be open and staring (or gazing) upward; and whose line of a mouth suggests a wry smile. Above this figure, the midground conic pattern, on which the figure appears to be lying, undergoes a change both in form and colour, converging and becoming trunk-like, with vertical lines in yellow and green rather than yellow and orange; close examination of this form shows four and perhaps five more droplet shapes, barely visible amid the intensity of yellow-green colour. Higher still, this fourth component expands into a wide oval, like the canopy of a tree, and outlined in intense green and
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yellow. Within the oval is a textual excerpt, such as accompanies the book’s other drawings. In this case, it is from the 1977 book *Dialogues*, that Deleuze did with Claire Parnet, and reads (without page reference): “[...] tout événement est un brouillard de gouttes” (Deleuze – Duhême 42; parenthesized ellipsis in the text). Atop the oval is the fifth imagistic component in the drawing: a dancing naked child, rendered in white with open eyes, a smiling mouth, and rosy cheeks.

Jane Newland reads this drawing in terms of “Deleuze’s corpse lying beneath a tree” (Newland 2012 6). Given the hostility of Deleuze and Guattari to “the arborescent relation” in favour of rhizomatic “becomings” in *Mille Plateaux*, this seems incongruous, but could indeed again suggest Duhême’s implicit repudiation of Deleuze – Guattari in favour of Deleuze. The drawing in colour, though, as much suggests an incorporeal eruption – a sort of rhizomatic mushroom cloud – in moist and fertilizing night, which is also infused with white droplets. Either way, what is especially striking is the figure of a dancing naked child atop this eruptive yellow-green form, above – to credit Newland’s reading – Deleuze’s wryly smiling supine naked corpse depicted lying at its base, as though the form itself, with its internal vertical lines, were rendered eruptive by his body. The image appears to provide a potent suggestion, as filtered through his friend Duhême’s visual imagination, of what Deleuze of 1962, in *Nietzsche et la philosophie*, calls “la résurrection dionysiaque,” in the form of a child (*Np* 18). But there is more, in that neither naked figure is shown with external genitalia. The figure identified by Newland with Deleuze is in a position where they would not be visible anyway. The dancing child, by contrast, is presented in such a way that they would be visible if they existed. Is this, then, indeed “une petite fille”... but paradoxically merged, as a last disjunctive synthesis appropriate to Deleuze, with “Dionysos-enfant,” precisely in “la résurrection dionysiaque” of which he wrote so eloquently in his early works on Nietzsche?

Deleuze was also surely familiar, given his exegeses of Nietzsche’s *Zarathustra* in 1962 and 1965, with its chapter called “Vom freien Tode” (“On free death”), and its exhortation “Stirb zur rechten Zeit” / “Die at the right time” (Nietzsche 2003 I 21). This continues: “Den vollbringen Tod zeige ich euch, der den Lebenden ein Stachel und ein Gelöbniss wird.” Or in Thomas Common’s translation: “The consummating death I show unto you, which becometh a stimulus and promise to the living” (Nietzsche 1999). But “Stachel” in German takes multiple meanings: spike, sting, and backbone among them. It seems fair to suggest that, in his death as
performed, Deleuze effected “den vollbringenden Tod” / “the consummating death” as advocated for by Nietzsche’s Zarathustra. He did so with a level of sense production apt to Logique du sens, via aspects whose series relations and resonance – to do with Alice, with Dionysos-enfant, with “a child” of Différence et répétition in the passage through the crossing of the figure 8 – would both affirm the sustained importance of the Idea “enfant” / “child” as a line through his œuvre, and its differenciations. Thus does it become “der den Lebenden ein Stachel,” in multiple English meanings of the word: not all of them pleasant.

Likewise the element of “Gelöbniss,” or promise. “Dionysos est le dieu de l’affirmation,” Deleuze of 1993 writes in the essay “Mystère d’Ariane selon Nietzsche,” that appears in Critique et clinique after “Ce que les enfants disent.”

Which itself ends with the words: “invoquant Dionysos comme le dieu des lieux de passage et des choses d’oubli” (Cc 130, 88).

What sort of affirmation, in “le coup de dés”?

This thesis has offered a kind of map analogous to the maps of trajectories and intensities suggested by Deleuze in “Ce que les enfants disent.” In this case the space mapped has been textual, across the surfaces provided by ten works by Deleuze alone, or by Deleuze with others: Félix Guattari, Claire Parnet, and Jacqueline Duhême. These surfaces are loci of sense, that erupt with intensities. The suggestion has been that the term “enfant,” with neither article nor other qualification, but offered jointly with “child” because conversation between French and English has been so integral to Deleuze’s reception, has in the vocabulary of Différence et répétition the status of an Idea. Deleuze of 1969 quotes Proust in describing Ideas: “Réels sans être actuels, idéaux sans être abstraits,” and also adds “symboliques sans être fictifs” (Der 269). As domained in “the virtual,” “enfant” / “child” is in this vocabulary both differential and multiple; it differenciates in becoming textual. This begins in Deleuze’s œuvre regarding “enfant” / “child” before he provides this vocabulary in Différence et répétition, via the two books on Nietzsche of 1962 and 1965. There “enfant” becomes “Enfant,” and is linked also not only with “Dionysos-enfant” and “jeu d’enfant, l’enfant dieu,” but also with a “cosmodicée” where chance and “le coup de dés” are affirmed. The Idea “enfant” / “child” next differenciates / textually actualizes as “un enfant” / “a child” in Différence et répétition, as Alice in Logique du sens, as Boy with Machine in L’Anti-Œdipe: the list goes on. In parallel with these
differenciations are also new vocabularies given by Deleuze: production of sense through series set resonating by “the paradoxical instance” in Logique du sens; the relation “plan d’immanence” / “personnage conceptuel” / “concept” in Qu’est-ce que la philosophie?. Through all these differenciations of “enfant” / “child” and all these vocabularies that feed toward a kind of mapping described in “Ce que les enfants disent” in terms of “espace” / “intensité,” “Trajets et devenirs” (Cc 84, 88; italics in text), Deleuze emerges (including through the window frame) as having exemplified the terms of “devenir enfant” / “becoming child” offered in 1965: “Jeu et nouveau commencement, créateur de nouvelles valeurs et de nouveaux principes d’évaluation.”
End Notes

1. A more programmatic approach to Deleuze’s reading of Nietzsche’s story, relating it to a concept of “lived curriculum” in education, and to a different series of terms in works by Deleuze and Deleuze-Guattari, is provided by Jason Wallin in the essay “Morphologies for a Pedagogical Life,” that appears in Diana Masny and Inna Semetsky, Deleuze and Education (Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh Press, 2012; 196-214). The essay was also presented as a paper called “On the Camels, Lions, and Children of Education,” at the fifth annual Deleuze Studies Conference in New Orleans in June, 2012.

The following notes have to do with matters of translation.

2. (page 26) Paul Patton in the 1994 translation of Différence et répétition understandably gives “the child is constructed on a double series” for “l’enfant se construit sur une double série,” using the passive impersonal. English lacks the ambiguity of the French reflexive pronoun.

3. (page 29) In the standard translation of Logique du sens by Mark Lester (with Charles Stivale and editing by Constantin Boundas), Deleuze’s genre statement “ce livre est un essai de roman logique et psychanalytique” is given, inexplicably, as “This book is an attempt to develop a logical and psychological novel” (LoS xiv). Deleuze did not write the French for “psychological,” which is “psychologique.” He wrote “psychanalytique.” What this implies is that since 1990, when Columbia University Press published The Logic of Sense, the English-language reader who has entered the translation via the Preface has been given a skewed sense of Deleuze’s own capsule introduction. For the vocabularies of “psychology” and “psychoanalysis” do not map onto one another without friction.

4. (page 45) Deleuze’s provision of the italicized part of this quotation in English at the end of Logique du sens is not indicated in the Columbia University Press translation The Logic of Sense. Rather, in the translation it is even given unitalicized, with quotation marks the only indication of discontinuity with the rest of the passage. The English-language reader therefore gets no sense of the distinctiveness given to this sequence of words by Deleuze, who made them discontinuous with the rest of the French text not only via quotation marks, but by italicizing them and giving them in English.

5. (page 52) This direct association of image with first page of text is absent in the English translation, where the frontispiece to the title page for the book, Boy with Machine is a full
twenty four pages from the opening paragraph. Accordingly, given that Boy with Machine is the only image in the entire book, the English-language reader is denied this direct connection between its prominence and a new set of terms associated visually, and compellingly, with “enfant” / “child” in French, as these appear in the book’s first paragraph.

6. (page 59) The English translation of “Lettre à un critique sévère” omits this new reference to “enfants” in the context of Deleuze’s reading of Nietzsche: “Des enfants dans le dos, c’est lui qui vous en fait.” Instead it gives “He gets up to all sorts of things behind your back” (Ne 6; italics in text). This seems doubly unfortunate given the role played precisely for Deleuze by his reading of Nietzsche in introducing a template not for “l’enfant ... monstrueux” but, via the figure of Dionysos, for “Enfant” / “Child.” The sense is also lost that Deleuze considered himself to have been given “un enfant dans le dos” by Nietzsche.
Appendix A:

Danny Lloyd as Danny Torrance, in Stanley Kubrick’s 1980 film version of Stephen Kings’s 1974 novel *The Shining*: a specificity anticipated by Deleuze’s ostensibly generalizable scenario for “un enfant” / “a child” in *Différence et répétition* (1968). “...il met plusieurs doigts dans sa bouche, entoure ce foyer de l’autre bras, et apprécie l’ensemble de la situation du point de vue de cette mère virtuelle” (Der 132). Details differ; intensity would seem to be comparable.
Appendix B:

Passage through the vertical plane. “Alice ... dégage son double incorporel” (Logique du sens 19) / Le “croisement du 8, au point de jonction des deux cercles dissymétriques qui se coupent, le cercle des objet réels et celui des objets ou foyers virtuels” (Différence et répétition 133).

Drawing by John Tenniel for Through the Looking Glass, and What Alice Found There (1871).
Appendix C:
Juxtapositions

1. Lindner’s *Boy with Machine* in *L’Anti-Cédipe:* with facing text introducing “les machines désirantes” in terms of “Ça fonctionne partout, tantôt sans arrêt, tantôt discontinu. Ça respire, ça chauffe, ça mange. Ça chie, ça baise. Qu’elle erreur d’avoir dit le ça. Partout ce sont des machines...”

2. *Boy with Machine* as placed in the English translation *Anti-Oedipus.* There is no visual relation of image to text that casts the unconscious (“Ça,” as per the vocabulary of psychoanalysis) in terms of “machines” and, in the French edition, links both with this image.

3. Alice meets Tweedledum and Tweedledee in *Through the Looking Glass,* as per the drawing by John Tenniel. Repetitions with difference in relation to *Boy with Machine* (doubled) include: obese, grotesquely proportioned bodies based on an egg-shape, face-on view, turned out toes, a crossing of arms, thick verticals in background.
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---. Correspondence. 11 January, 2014.
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